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JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction of this Petition for Review from
the final Order of the Department of Commerce, Division of Real
Estate pursuant to Section 78-2a-3(2)(a), Utah Code

Ann.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1.

Whether the fact that Petitioner Orion Dale Quinlan

(hereinafter, "Quinlan") was not allowed an opportunity to present
evidence or argument to the decision-maker, i.e. the Real Estate
Commission (hereinafter, "the Commission"), and the fact that the
decision-maker

did not review a transcript

or record

of the

proceedings before the Administrative Law Judge constitutes a
violation of Quinlan's right to due process of law, as guaranteed
by Article I, Section 7, of the Constitution of Utah and Amendment
XIV, Section 1, of the Constitution of the United States, rendering
the agency action unconstitutional within the meaning of Section
63-46b-16(4) (a) ,

Utah

Code

Ann.

(Repl.

Vol.

6D

1993)

and

constituting an unlawful procedure or decision making process
within the meaning of Section 63-46b-16(4)(e), Utah

Code

Ann.

(Repl. Vol. 6D 1993).
The standard of review applicable to this question of law is
a "correction-of-error" standard, with no deference given to the
agency's decision or its procedure. Questar
State

Tax Commission,

Pipeline

817 P.2d 316, 318 (Ut. 1991).
1

Co. vs.

Utah

2.

Whether

the

fact that

the Administrative

Law. Judge

recommended that Quinlanfs license be placed on probation, as
opposed to suspended, and the fact that the Commission adopted both
the

Findings

of

Fact

and

Conclusions

of

Law

issued

by

the

Administrative Law Judge, yet ordered that Quinlan's license be
suspended, rather than placed on probation, renders the suspension
of Quinlan's license arbitrary and capricious within the meaning of
Section 63-46b-16(4) (h) (iv) , Utah Code Ann.

(Repl. Vol. 6D 1993)

and/or not supported by substantial evidence within the meaning of
Section 63-46b-16(4)(g), Utah Code Ann.

(Repl. Vol. 6D 1993).

The standard of review applicable to this issue is whether
substantial

evidence

does

not

support

the

decision

Inc.

vs.

Board of Review,

the

Intermountain

Commission upon a review of the "whole record".
Healthcare,

of

839 P. 2d 841, 844 (Utah App.

1992) .

The standard of review applicable to the claim that the

agency

action

reasonableness.

was

arbitrary

Anderson

vs.

and

Public

capricious
Service

is

Commission

that
of

of
Utah,

839 P.2d 822, 824 (Ut. 1992).
3.

Whether the Commission's Order, dated December 3, 1993,

is void for the reason that the Commission had previously entered
an Order, dated November 3, 1993, which was confirmed, adopted and
issued

by

the

Division

of

Real

Estate

(hereinafter,

"the

Division"), thus rendering the second Order the result of an
2

unlawful procedure or decision-making process within the meaning of
Section 63-46b-16(4)(e), Utah Code Ann.

(Repl. Vol, 6D 1993).

The standard of review applicable to this question of law is
that of "correction-of-error". Questar
Tax Commission,
4.

Pipeline

Co. vs.

Utah

State

817 P.2d 316, 318 (Ut. 1991).

Whether the Commission's Order, dated November 3, 1993,

fails to comply with the requirements of Section 63-46b-10(1)(c),
Utah Code Ann.
statement

of

(Repl. Vol. 6D 1993) in that it does not include a
the

reasons

for

the

Commission's

decision

and

therefore the Division has engaged in an unlawful procedure within
the meaning of Section 63-46b-16(4)(e), Utah Code Ann.

(Repl. Vol.

6D 1993) .
The standard of review applicable to this question of law is
the "correction-of-error" standard.
State

Tax Commission,
5.

Whether

Questar

Pipeline

Co. vs.

Utah

817 P.2d 316, 318 (Ut. 1991).
the

agency

decision

is

contrary

to,

and

inconsistent with, its prior practice without a rational basis for
that inconsistency within the meaning of Section 63-46b-16(h)(iii),
Utah Code Ann.
The

(Repl. Vol. 6D 1993).

standard

of

"correction-of-error".

review
Pickett

applicable
vs.

to

this

Utah Department

of

issue

is

Commerce,

858 P.2d 187, 191 (Ut. App. 1993).
6.

Whether the Commission's Order, dated December 3, 1993,
3

is based on a policy which was not adopted in accordance with the
Administrative
Code Ann.
for

the

Rule

Making

Act,

Section 63-46a-l, et. seq.,

Utah

(Repl. Vol. 6D 1993) and therefore may not form a basis
Commission's

decision,

rendering

the

decision-making

process unlawful within the meaning of Section 63-46b-16(4) (e),
Utah Code Ann.

(Repl. Vol. 6D 1993).

The Standard of Review applicable to this question of law is
"correction-of-error".
Commission,
7.
Division,

Questar

Pipeline

Co.

vs.

Utah

State

Tax

817 P.2d 316, 318 (Ut. 1991).
Whether ex parte
acting

Commission, acting

in

communication between the staff of the

their

prosecutorial

capacity,

and

the

as an adjudicative body, which caused the

issuance of its Order dated December 3, 1993, constitutes a denial
of Quinlan's right to due process as guaranteed by Article I,
Section 7, of the Constitution of Utah and Amendment XIV, Section
1, of the Constitution of the United States.
The Standard of Review applicable to this question of law is
a "correction-of-error" standard with no deference given to the
Agency's decision or its procedure.
State

Tax Commission,

Questar

Pipeline

Co. vs.

Utah

817 P.2d 316, 318 (Ut. 1991).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

There are no statutes or constitutional provisions whose
interpretation, alone, is determinative of the issues presented.
4

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.
Nature of Case and Course of Proceedings
Quinlan was a real estate sales agent licensed by the State of
Utah, Department of Commerce, Division of Real Estate, holding
License No. SA 27188.

(R. 4, f2 and R. 14, f2).

Quinlan entered a plea of guilty before the United States
District Court for the District of Utah, Central Division, to one
charge of mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. §1341.

(R. 5, ^[4;

R. 14, 54; R. 19 J[3) .
Subsequently, Quinlan completed an application for the renewal
of his license.

On that application Quinlan responded in the

negative to the question, "[h]ave you been convicted of a criminal
offense in the last two years?".

(R. 5, J6 and R. 15, 56).

On April 13, 1993, the Division filed a Petition with the
Commission, through which it sought to revoke Quinlan1s license,
alleging that he had violated the provisions of Sections 61-2-11(1)
and (12), Utah Code Ann.

(R. 6).

The Division's Petition was heard before Administrative Law
Judge J. Stephen Eklund on October 18, 1993.

(Tr., P. 3 ) .

As set forth in his Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Recommended

Order

(R.

19-26),

the

Administrative

Law

Judge

recommended to the Commission that Quinlan1s license be placed on
probation,

fl

. . . concurrent with the duration of his existing
5

probation as to his federal mail fraud conviction41.

(R. 26). A

copy of the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Recommended
Order is attached as Addendum I.
Quinlan was not provided an opportunity to present evidence or
argument to the Commission.
On November 3, 1993, the Commission issued its Order which
served to suspend Quinlanfs license to practice as a real estate
sales agent until

his probation arising from the mail fraud

conviction was completed and all restitution paid.

(R. 27-28).

That Order was confirmed, adopted and issued by the Director of the
Division.

(R. 28). A copy of that Order, dated November 3, 1993,

is attached hereto as Addendum II.
Thereafter, the Director of the Division sent correspondence
to members of the Commission in which he proposed that " . . . more
detail

on

the

Commission's

Order

would

be

appropriate"

and

requested that a second Order be signed by Commission members.

(R.

209) .
On December 3, 1993, the Commission issued a second Order
which is more detailed than the original Order.

(R. 211-218).

A

copy of the second Order is attached as Addendum III.
A transcript of the hearing before the Administrative Law
Judge was first prepared on January 4, 1994.
A

Petition

for

Agency

Review
6

was

(R. 195).

then

filed

with

the

Department of Commerce (hereinafter, "the Department")".

(R. 68-

72) .
On March 25, 1994, the Executive Director of the Department
issued her Order on Review Denying Oral Argument which serves to
affirm the Commission's Order of December 3, 1993, in its entirety.
(R. 266-271) . A copy of the Order on Review Denying Oral Argument
is attached hereto as Addendum IV.
B.
Statement of Facts
Quinlan does not dispute the Findings of Fact recommended by
the Administrative Law Judge (R. 19-26), which were affirmed and
adopted by the Commission

(R. 27 and 29) and adopted by the

Executive Director of the Department (R. 2 67).

Quinlan wishes to

direct this Court's attention to certain undisputed facts which are
not inconsistent with, and which in fact support, those Findings of
Fact.

Those facts are as follows:
1.

For a period of thirty-eight years, beginning in 1952,

Quinlan was employed, as a civilian employee, by the United States
Air Force.
2.

(Tr. P.9, Lns. 1-5; R. 19 f1).

While employed by the United States Air Force, Quinlan

had total responsibility for the budgeting and disbursement of
funds for the repair of all Air Force aircraft in Southeast Asia
during the Vietnam conflict.
3.

(Tr. P.9, Lns. 10-15).

Subsequently, for a period of one and one-half years,
7

Quinlan was responsible for the administration and disbursement of
funds for the repair of the F-16 aircraft in Brussels, Belgium.
(Tr. P.9, Lns. 16-25; Tr. P.10, Lns. 1-2).
4.

Quinlan had direct control of those funds administered by

him for the United States Air Force.
5.

(Tr. P.10, Lns. 3-8).

During the entire time Quinlan was employed by the United

States Air Force there were no allegations that he had improperly
authorized a disbursement of the funds he controlled, there was
never any allegation that he improperly accounted for funds subject
to his control, and regular audits of those funds never disclosed
any misuse of funds.
6.

(Tr. P.10, Lns. 9-22).

Quinlan was placed in charge of the Hill Air Force Base

Museum fund-raising campaign.
donations.
7.

In that position he received cash

(Tr. P.11, Lns. 2-9; Lns. 13-18).

At no time was there any allegation that Quinlan had

misused or misapplied funds received by him for the Hill Air Force
Base Museum.
8.

(Tr. P.11, Lns. 19-21).

Quinlan

supervised

committee for the City of Roy.
9.

fund-raising

for

the

"Roy

Days"

(Tr. P.11, Lns. 10-12).

As fund-raiser for the "Roy Days" committee, Quinlan

received direct donations in the form of cash and checks.

(Tr.

P.11, Lns. 22-25; Tr. P.12, Lns. 1-2).
10.

Quinlan's use and application of the funds received by
8

him on behalf of the "Roy Day's" committee was never questioned.
(Tr. P.12, Lns. 3-5).
11.

For a period of ten to fifteen years, - Quinlan served as

a Finance Clerk in the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints
for four different bishoprics and two stakes1 presidencies.

As

Finance Clerk, Quinlan was responsible for receiving donations,
maintaining accounting records and depositing those donations.
(Tr. P.12, Lns. 6-16).
12.

As Finance Clerk for the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter

Day Saints, Quinlan received donations in the form of both cash and
checks.
13.

(Tr. P.12, Lns. 17-19).
There were never any allegations that Quinlan had misused

or improperly accounted for Church funds.
14.

(Tr. P.12, Lns. 20-25).

Quinlan served as Branch President of the Church of Jesus

Christ of Latter Day Saints mission in Bangkok, Thailand.

(Tr.

P.13, Lns. 3-4).
15.

Quinlan has served in four bishoprics and two high-

counsels for the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints. (Tr.
P.13, Lns. 4-6).
16.

Quinlan

Adjustment.

is

a

member

of

the

Sunset

City

Board

of

There has never been any question raised as to his

ethical treatment of matters presented to the Board of Adjustment.
(Tr. P.13, Lns. 14-21).
9

17.

Quinlan served as Chairman of the Sunset City Planning

Commission.

Quinlan's

ethics,

in

connection

with

his

responsibility as Chairman of the Sunset City Planning Commission,
were never questioned.

(Tr. P. 13, Lns. 22-25; Tr. P. 14, Lns. 1-

12) .
18.

As a board member of the Clearfield Chamber of Commerce,

Quinlan was placed

in charge

of the Clearfield

4th

of July

activities, including receiving funds collected in connection with
those activities.
19.

(Tr. P.14, Lns. 13-25).

Quinlanfs ethics and the manner in which he fulfilled his

responsibilities as a board member of the Clearfield Chamber of
Commerce have never been questioned.
20.

Quinlan

served

as

(Tr. P.15, Lns. 1-5).

Chairman

of

the

Metro

Police

Consolidation Committee, a group which was charged with developing
a plan to consolidate the police departments of five Davis County
communities.
21.

(Tr. P.15, Lns. 6-19).

Quinlan has served as a Scout Master, President of the

Toast Masters Club of Hill Air Force Base, President of the Hill
Air Force Base Administrative Club and President of the Society of
Logistics.
22.

(Tr. P.15, Lns. 20-25; Tr. P.16, Lns. 1-12).
In each of those positions, Quinlan was charged with the

responsibility for the handling of organization funds.
Lns. 13-17).
10

(Tr. P.16,

23.

No question was ever raised as to the

manner in which

Quinlan handled funds for those organizations and there was never
any allegation that he had misused or misapplied funds entrusted to
him.

(Tr. P.16, Lns. 18-24).
24.

During the 1960fs, Quinlan was affiliated with Investment

Realty and while so affiliated had responsibility for the receipt
and disbursement of funds.
25.

(Tr. P.18, Lns. 9-16).

No question has been raised or allegation made that

Quinlan misused or misapplied funds received by Investment Realty.
(Tr. P.18, Lns. 17-20).
26.

Quinlan has never been informed by the Utah State Real

Estate Division that it had received any complaints concerning his
handling of funds at Investment Realty or at any other time or that
it had received any complaints whatsoever about his conduct as a
real estate sales agent.

(Tr. P.18, Lns. 21-25; Tr. P.19, Lns. 1-

8).
27.

Quinlan has never received any complaints from clients or

professional colleagues about his conduct as a real estate agent.
(Tr. P.19, Lns. 13-15).
28.

On July 9, 1992, Quinlan pled guilty to one count of mail

fraud before the United States District Court for the District of
Utah.
ordered

Quinlan was placed on probation for five years and was
to

pay

restitution

in
11

the

amount

of

$20,600.00

to

TransAmerica Insurance Company payable at the rate of a minimum of
$350.00 per month.

In addition, Quinlan was ordered to perform

fifty hours of community service.
29.

(R. 19 1[3) .

The crime for which Quinlan was convicted had no relation

to his practice as a real estate sales agent.

(Tr. P.20, Lns. 22-

25; Tr. P.21, Ln. 1; R. 21 J7).
30.

At the time of the hearing, on October 18, 1993, Mr.

Quinlan unequivocally admitted his guilt and testified as follows:
Q: (By Quinlan1s counsel) Mr. Quinlan, now I
am going to ask you some questions that may be
painful but ask that you be candid.
Is it
true that you entered a plea of guilty to mail
fraud; is that correct?
A:

Thatfs correct.

Q: Is it also true that a judgment of guilty
was entered based on the plea?
A:

Thatfs correct.

(Tr. P.20, Lns. 7-14) .
Q: (By counsel for the Division) Mr. Quinlan,
I must remark that you're resume is pretty
impressive. You've devoted much of your life
to service in various capacities, both in
civic and religious matters as well as
employment. But you did something pretty bad
in 1992, didn't you? You were convicted of
mail fraud.
That involved filing a false
police report that a peerless engine analyzer
had been stolen, because Tunex didn't have a
peerless engine analyzer, did it?
A:

No.

Q:

And you knew that?
12

A:

Yes.

(Tr. P.26, Lns. 3-14) .
Q:
(By counsel for the Division) Did you
commit fraud?
A:

Yes.

(Tr. P.37, Lns. 20-21).
31.

With regard to his feelings of guilt about his conviction

and the conduct giving rise to that conviction, Quinlan testified
as follows:
Q: (By counsel for Quinlan) Mr. Quinlan, I
would like you to tell Administrative Law
Judge Eklund how you feel about that
conviction.
A: Well, it's the most difficult thing that
I've had to live through. I have - it's the
first thing that you think of every morning
and the last thing every night. Devasting.
My reputation is on the line. I'm well-known
in the community as one that is above
reproach. I have served long and well in not
only Church but in every capacity and this has
been very difficult for me.
The greatest asset that I have that has helped
me through this is a wife of 4 0 years who is
very loving and very understanding. And also
my family, 4 children and 11 grandchildren
that have rallied around me and given me great
support and (inaudible) but it is a very
difficult experience.
Q: I can tell that it's painful to talk about
this.
Would you like a short break, Mr.
Quinlan?
A:

No.

(Tr. P.21, Lns. 2-21).
13

32.

Quinlan

has

complied

with

every

requirement

of his

probation, including making timely monthly payments of restitution.
R. 21 ^ 8 ) .
33.

Should Quinlan violate any state, local or federal law,

his probation would be revoked and he would be incarcerated.

(Tr.

P.23, Lns. 6-13).
34.

At the time Quinlan spoke with Cathy Howick of the State

of Utah Insurance Department, during the month of April, 1993,
Quinlan was then experiencing difficulty in personally accepting
the fact that he had been convicted of a crime.

(Tr. P. 53, Lns.

24-25; Tr. P.54, Lns. 1-20).
35.

Quinlan surrendered, or did not contest the revocation

of, his license to sell insurance issued by the State of Utah.
(Tr. P.17, Lns. 8-19; Tr. P.54, Lns. 15-20).
36.

Quinlan was never notified by the Insurance Commission of

the State of Utah that it had received any complaints about his
conduct as an insurance agent other than those related to the
criminal conviction which is the subject of this proceeding.

(Tr.

P.17, Lns. 19-23).
37.

As a real estate sales agent now associated with Better

Homes and Gardens, Quinlan does not have access to client funds.
(Tr. P.19, Lns. 16-25; Tr. P.20, Lns. 1-6).
38.

Quinlan is not qualified for any available employment
14

other than in the insurance or real estate field.

(Tr. P.23, Lns.

17-25; Tr. P.24, Lns. 1-4).
39.

On December 14, 1993, in response to a request pursuant

to the Government Records Access and Management Act, counsel for
the Division provided a copy of the first Order, dated November 3,
1993, to counsel for Quinlan.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.

Procedural due process requires that Quinlan be afforded

a hearing before the decision maker.

Quinlan was not allowed to

present argument to the decision maker, i.e. the Commission.
Commission did not review the evidence presented

The

by Quinlan.

Because Quinlan was denied due process, the Agency action is
unconstitutional within the meaning of Section 63-46b-16(4)(a),
Utah Code Ann.
2.

The

Commission

adopted

the

Findings

of

Fact

and

Conclusions of Law issued by the Administrative Law Judge.

Its

decision, i.e. to suspend Quinlan's license, is inconsistent with
those Findings and Conclusions. Therefore, the Commission's Orders
and the Order of the Executive Director are each arbitrary and
capricious within the meaning of Section 63-46b-16(4)(h)(iv), atah
Code Ann.,

and are not supported by substantial evidence within the

meaning of Section 63-46b-16(4)(g), Utah Code
3.

Ann.

The Commission's Order, dated December 3, 1993, is void
15

because

the

Commission

had

previously

entered-,

adopted

and

confirmed an Order addressing the same subject matter and arising
from the same proceeding.

The Order, dated December 3, 1993,

cannot be a valid nunc pro tunc

order and is, therefore, the result

of an unlawful procedure within the meaning of Section 63-46b16(4)(e), Utah Code
4.

Ann.

The Commission's Order, dated November 3, 1993, does not

include a statement of the reasons for the Commission's decision
and, therefore, fails to comply with Section 63-46b-10(l) (c) , Utah
Code Ann.,

and constitutes an unlawful procedure within the meaning

of Section 63-46b-16(4)(e), Utah Code
5.

Ann.

The agency decision is inconsistent with its own prior

decisions.

The Agency has not provided a sound rational basis for

that inconsistency.

Therefore, the Agency decision must be set

aside pursuant to Section 63-46b-16(h)(iii), Utah Code
6.

Ann.

Both of the Commission's Orders are based on a "new

policy" to the effect that applications for the renewal of real
estate sales agent license will be denied so long as the applicant
is on probation or has not completed the payment of restitution.
This

policy

has

not

been

adopted

requirements of the Administrative
1, et. seq.,

Utah Code Ann.,

in

accordance

Rule Making Act,

with

the

Section 63-46a-

and, therefore, may not form a basis

for the Commission's decision.

Thus, the decision making process
16

is unlawful within the meaning of Section 63-46b-16(4) (e) , Utah
Code

Ann.
1.

The Director of the Division, acting in his prosecutorial

capacity, communicated, ex parte,
its

adjudicative

capacity,

Commission's final Order.

with the Commission, acting in

concerning

the

contents

of

the

That Communication caused a revision of

the Commission's Order, dated November 3, 1993, and the issuance of
a

second

Order,

dated

December

3,

1993.

That

ex

parte

communication constitutes a violation of due process, rendering the
decision making process unconstitutional within the meaning of
Section 63-46b-16(4)(a), Utah Code Ann.,

and unlawful within the

meaning of Section 63-46b-16(4)(e), Utah Code Ann.f

therefore, the

Agency decision must be vacated.
ARGUMENT
I.
Denial of Procedural Due Process
Procedural due process, as guaranteed by Article I, Section 7,
of the Constitution of Utah, and by Amendment XIV, Section 1, of
the Constitution of the United States of America, applies to a
proceeding in which a person's license to engage in a profession
may be revoked. D.B. vs.
Licensing,

Division

of Occupational

and

Professional

119 P.2d 1145, 1146 (Utah App. 1989).

Procedural due process includes the fundamental right to a
17

hearing.

As rioted in Wiscombe

vs.

Wiscombe,

744 P.2d 1024 (Utah

App. 1987):
One of the fundamental requisites of due
process is the opportunity to be fully heard.
(744 P.2d at 1025).
By definition, the right to be "fully heard" includes the
right to present argument to the decision-maker and to have the
decision maker consider all of the evidence presented.
In the present case, Quinlan was not afforded an opportunity
to present argument to the decision-maker, i.e. the Commission, nor
did the Commission consider all of the evidence presented by
Quinlan.
The Commissions Orders, dated November 3, 1993, and December
3, 1993, are both purportedly based solely on the Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law prepared by the Administrative Law Judge.
Those Findings and Conclusions are narrowly drafted and exclude
much of the evidence presented by Quinlan, as well as the argument
presented by his counsel.
In point of fact, a transcript of the proceedings before the
Administrative

Law

Judge

was

not

prepared

until

after

the

Commission's Order had been issued.
Simply stated, because Quinlan was not allowed an opportunity
to present argument to the Commission, and because the Commission
did not consider all of the evidence presented by him, he has been
18

denied procedural due process. Therefore, the Division's first and
second Orders and the Order of the Executive Director affirming
those Orders must be set aside pursuant to Section 63-46b-16(4) (a) ,
Utah Code

Ann.
II.

The Commission's Orders Are Arbitrary And Capricious
And Not Supported By Substantial Evidence
Both of the Commission's Orders and the Order on Review
Denying Oral Argument, issued by the Director, are arbitrary and
capricious within the meaning of Section 63-46b-16(4)(h)(iv), Utah
Code Ann.,

and are not supported by substantial evidence within the

meaning of Section 63-46b-16(4)(g), Utah Code

Ann.

Because Quinlan does not dispute the limited Findings of Fact
recommended by the Administrative Law Judge and adopted by both the
Commission and the Director, marshalling of the evidence is not
necessary.

It is the ultimate decisions based on those limited

findings which are arbitrary and capricious, and are not supported
by substantial evidence.
The Commission's first Order, dated November 3, 1993, provides
only

the

most

cursory

Commission's decision.
provides greater detail.

explanation

of

the

reasons

for

the

However, the Commission's second Order
Read in its entirety, the Commission's

second Order appears to be based, in large part, on its perception
that "mitigating factors" are not present in this case.
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This

perception, apparently based upon the Commission's review of the
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law is not supported by the
evidence presented at the hearing and is not supported by the
Findings of Fact.

As mentioned above, the Commission could not

have reviewed a transcript of the hearing.
Admittedly, the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law do not
detail the numerous mitigating factors established at the hearing.
However, the Administrative Law Judge specifically stated that his
analysis, and therefore his Recommended Order, were " . . .

based

on due consideration of any aggravating or mitigating circumstances
." so that he might assess the extent to which Quinlan's
conviction " . . . 'is adversely reflective of his ability to
properly discharge duties performed by a licensee'".

(R.23).

The Administrative Law Judge specifically stated, " . . . the
instant case presents many mitigating circumstances similar to the
Hutchinson,,

O'Brien

and Goodman cases."

(R.25) The Administrative

Law Judge noted that Quinlan continues to diligently satisfy the
terms of his probation, that his conviction did not arise from
conduct relating to his practice as a real estate sales agent, that
his status as a licensee did not facilitate the criminal conduct,
that Quinlan has not engaged in any unprofessional conduct while
acting as a real estate sales agent, that he has not been the
subject of any complaints arising from his practice as a sales
20

agent, and that there is no substantial basis to conclude that
Quinlan will likely engage in similar criminal misconduct in the
future or that his ability to properly

discharge the duties

performed by a licensee have been measurably compromised by his
conviction.

(R.25).

Having recited these few specific mitigating factors and the
conclusions which he reached based on hearing the testimony and
evidence,

the

Administrative

Law

Judge

apparently

felt

it

unnecessary to bolster his recommended Order with a catalog of all
of the factors which should be considered in mitigation and which
were established at the hearing.

A recitation of those factors is

set forth in the Statement of Facts,

supra.

In spite of the presence of substantial mitigating factors, in
its second Order the Commission attempted to distinguish those
cases cited by the Administrative Law Judge in his Conclusions of
Law from the facts present in this case.

In fact, the cases are

not distinguishable, as discussed below.
The Commission distinguished the mitigating factors ostensibly
present

in

In

re:

Goodman,

Case

No. RE

92-03-19

(Oct. 14,

1992)(attached hereto as Addendum V ) , because in Goodman,
applicant " . . .

the

candidly acknowledged his prior indiscretions".

In the present case, Quinlan repeatedly acknowledged that he had
pled guilty to the charge of mail fraud, that a conviction was
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entered based on that plea and that he had committed fraud.

(Tr.

20, Lns. 7-14; p. 26, Lns. 3-14; p. 37, Lns. 20-21).
The Commission also noted that

in Goodman

the applicant

recognized the "seriousness of his past misconduct".

Quinlan not

only recognized the seriousness of his crime, but testified as to
the daily

emotional

toll taken by the guilt

experiences as a result of his criminal conduct.

and

anguish

he

(Tr. P. 21, Lns.

2-21).
In Goodman,

the Commission noted that the applicant stated

that he would " . . .
inappropriate behavior".

scrupulously avoid a recurrence of such
(Goodman,

Conclusions, p. 4)

In the

present case, the Administrative Law Judge specifically found that
" . . .[t]here is no substantial basis to conclude respondent will
likely engage in similar criminal misconduct in the future or that
his ability to properly discharge duties performed by a licensee
has been measurably compromised by reason of his conviction."

(R.

25) .
In Goodman, as noted by the Commission, the applicant provided
information and cooperated with authorities.

Quinlan entered a

plea of guilty in the charge filed against him in the United States
District Court and signed a stipulation resulting in the revocation
of his license to practice as an insurance agent.
54, Lns. 15-20).
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(R. 20 and Tr.

In Goodman,

the applicant had completed his state probation

and fully paid restitution, but was still on probation arising from
his federal conviction and had not completed the payment of his
fine arising from the federal charges.

The Administrative Law

Judge found that Quinlan had complied with all terms of his
probation, although he had not then completed the payments required
by his federal conviction.
In Goodman,

(R. 3, f8).

the applicant's license was placed on probation

concurrent with the duration of his existing probation.
evidence presented

The

in this case is indistinguishable from the

Findings of Fact recorded in Goodman,

with the exception of the

numerous, mitigating circumstances which are found in the present
case.
Similarly, in its second Order, the Commission attempted to
distinguish the facts in In re:

Hutchinson,

Case No. RE 91-03-04

(Nov. 20, 1991) (attached hereto as Addendum VI) from the facts
present

in this case.

Incredibly, in its second Order, the

Commission suggests that the criminal misconduct in Hutchinson

was

mitigated or excused by the suggestion that the crime may have been
preceded by an excessive consumption of alcohol.

Simply stated,

abuse of drugs is not a mitigating factor and does not excuse
criminal misconduct.
Again, the facts presented to the Commission in Hutchinson
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are

indistinguishable,

in any

substantial

aspect, from

the

facts

presented by Quinlan to the Administrative Law Judge, with the
exception of the numerous, additional mitigating factors present in
this case.

The sanctions imposed against Quinlan should not be

more harsh than those imposed in

Hutchinson.

Similarly, in its second Order, the Commission attempted to
distinguish its decision in the present case from its Order in In
re:

O'Brien,

Case No. RE 90-11-2 3 (Jan. 17. 1992)(attached hereto

as Addendum VII).

In its Order, dated December 3, 1993, the

Commission states " . . .
O'Brien's case . . .".

no restitution was involved in Mr.

(R. 30).

In O'Brien,

the Administrative

Law Judge specifically found that the respondent " . . .
ordered

to

pay

restitution,

the

amount

of

which

determined by the Adult Probation and Parole Division."

was also

was

to

be

(O'Brien,

Findings of Fact, No. 5, p. 3) .
The Commission also notes that O'Brien had satisfied his
criminal probation to the extent that he was not required to report
to Adult Probation and Parole at the time of the final Order.
However, at the time of hearing, O'Brien had completed only 25 of
100 hours of community service and had not completed his probation.
The mere fact that the procedures utilized in the state and
federal probation systems differ as to reporting requirements and
that, in O'Brien,

the Administrative Law Judge opined that because
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the amount of restitution had not been established, it was possible
that

restitution

would

not

distinguish the Order in O'Brien
in O'Brien,

be

required,

does

not

from the present case.

serve

to

In fact,

the Administrative Law Judge specifically noted that

the respondent's crime was " . . . not entirely unrelated to [his]
status as a licensee" and that he realized a " . . . substantial
financial benefit . . . " from his criminal misconduct.

(O'Brien,

Findings of Fact, p. 5 ) .
For the foregoing reasons, both Orders of the Commission and
the Order of the Director, affirming those Commission Orders, are
each arbitrary and capricious and are not supported by substantial
evidence.
In addition, the Commission's Orders and the Order of the
Director are arbitrary and capricious because they are internally
inconsistent.
In both Commission Orders and in the Director's Order, the
Commission and the Director expressly adopt the Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law prepared by the Administrative Law Judge.
Those Conclusions specifically note the presence of "many
mitigating

circumstances", that Quinlan's ability

to properly

discharge his duties as a licensee has not been compromised and
that placing Quinlan's license on probation, concurrent with his
probation, will allow the Commission and the Division to monitor
25

Quinlan1s practice as a sales agent and will "adequately protect
the public".

(R. 25).

The Administrative

Law Judge concluded

that

even

though

Quinlan made a substantial misrepresentation during the license
renewal

process, that

disciplinary sanctions.

factor

did

not

support

enhancement

of

(R. 25).

Because the Commission adopted those Findings and Conclusions,
in full, its Orders are internally inconsistent and are therefore
arbitrary and capricious and cannot be supported by substantial
evidence.
For this additional reason, the Orders of the Commission and
the Executive Director's Order must be reversed and set aside.
III.
The Commission's Order, Dated December 3, 1993, Is Void
The Commission first entered an Order on November 3, 1993,
which was confirmed, adopted and issued by the Division of Real
Estate.

(R. 27-28).

Without notice to Quinlan or his counsel, the Commission
replaced that initial Order with a subsequent Order, dated December
3, 1993.
The only possible procedural device through which the second
Order might be considered valid, is if it were a properly entered
nunc pro

tunc

order.
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As noted in Diehl

Lumber Transportation,

Inc.

vs.

Mickelson,

802 P.2d 739 (Utah App. 1990), the function of a nunc

pro

tunc

order is "not to make an order now for then, but to enter for then
an order previously made". (802 P.2d at 742).

The Court also

stated that there are only two types of permissible nunc pro

tunc

order, i.e. (1) to correct a clerical error; or (2) to provide a
remedy when a party dies after submission of a case but before
judgment is entered.

(802 P.2d at 742).

Neither of these criteria

are applicable to the present situation.

Therefore, the Order

dated December 3, 1993, is void.
The initial Order was not set aside or vacated.
Commission

had

earlier

entered

an

order

based

Because the
on

the

same

adjudicative hearing, the second Order, dated December 3, 1993, is
a nullity, and is therefore void as an unlawful procedure or
decision-making process within the meaning of Section 63-46b16(4)(e), Utah Code

Ann.
IV.

The Commission's Order Dated November 3, 1993,
Must Be Set Aside
The Commission's Order, dated November 3, 1993, fails to
comply with the requirements of Section 63-46b-10(l)(c), Utah Code
Ann.,

in that it does not include a detailed statement of the

reasons for the Commission's decision. Therefore, the Division has
engaged in an unlawful procedure within the meaning of Section 6327

46b-16(40(e) , Utah

Code

Ann.

For this reason, the Executive

Director's Order, insofar as it may construed to affirm the Order
of November 3, 1993, must similarly be set aside.
V.
The Commission's Orders And The Order Of The Executive
Director Are Inconsistent With Prior Agency Decisions
And, Therefore, Must Be Set Aside
In Pickett

vs.

Utah

Department

of

Commerce,

858 P.2d, 187

(Utah App. 1993) , the Court held that Section 63-46b-16(4) (h) (iii) ,
Utah Code Ann.,

requires an agency to bear the burden of providing

facts and reasons that demonstrate a fair and rational basis for a
departure from previous standards for assessing penalties.
The suspension of Quinlan's license is inconsistent with prior
practice of both the Department and the Commission.

In the

interest of brevity, Quinlan will not repeat the discussion of
inconsistent prior decisions by the Commission as set forth at page
nos. 21-2 5, supra.
Jay Wilson,

In addition, in the Matter

of

the

License

of

Case No. RE91-04-13 (February 25, 1993)(attached hereto

as Addendum VIII), the Commission revoked Mr. Wilson's real estate
sales agent license based upon conviction of a criminal offense,
i.e. the entry of a guilty plea to mail fraud and conspiracy.
However, that revocation was stayed on the condition that Mr.
Wilson comply with restitution requirements and the terms of his
criminal probation.

The mitigating factors found in the present
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case are not noted in Wilson.

Clearly, as discussed in detail

above, and as demonstrated by the great disparity between the
sanctions

applied

in

Wilson,

and

in

the

present

case,

the

suspension of Quinlan's license is contrary to the agency's prior
practice, and the agency has not justified the inconsistency.
VI.
The Commission's Orders Involve An Unlawful
Decision-Making Process
The Commission's Order, dated November 3, 1993, states, in
part:
The recommended Order is not adopted because
it is inconsistent with the Utah Real Estate
Commission's policy of not allowing licensure
until an applicant has successfully completed
probation and paid all restitution. (R. 27).
The Commission's Order, dated December 3, 1993, states, in
part:
The Commission further notes that its recent
policy with respect to initial applicants with
criminal
convictions
has been to deny
licensure until all restitution has been paid
and until probation or parole has been
successfully
completed.
The Commission
concludes that it would fail to protect the
public to allow an individual who is already
licensed to retain his license and practice
the profession when an applicant in similar
circumstances would not be issued a license
and allowed to practice. (R. 30).
The Administrative
Utah

Code

Ann.f

Rule Making Act,

requires

that
29

Section 63-3 6a-l et.

administrative

agencies

seq.,

follow

certain procedures when adopting or implementing certain rules.
Section

63-46a-3(2),

Utah

Code

Ann.,

describes

those

circumstances under which an agency is required to adopt rules in
accordance with the procedures specified in the Act.

Subpart (2)

of that Section states that, in addition to other rule making
required by law, each agency shall make rules when agency action
requires

or prohibits

an action

and provides

or prohibits a

material benefit.
Section 61-2-5.5(1)(a), Utah Code Ann.,
Estate Commission

provides that the Real

shall make rules for the administration of

licensing of sales agents.
Section 61-2-6, Utah

Code

Ann.,

enumerates the statutory

licensing procedures and requirements for a real estate sales
agent. That section makes no reference to any requirement that the
payment

of

restitution

be

completed

and

terms

of

satisfied before a license may be granted or renewed.

probation
Therefore,

the "policy" referred to in both of the Commission's Orders must be
the subject of a rule.
Rule 162-2-2, Utah Administrative
procedure utilized by the Division.

Code,

governs the licensing

That Rule makes no reference

to any requirements concerning the payment of restitution or
completion of probation in the case of applicants convicted of a
crime.
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The Commission has not complied with the requirements of the
Administrative

Rule

discussed above.

Making

Act

in adopting

the

new

"policy"

Thus, the "policy" may not form a basis for the

agency decision in the present case.
Therefore, the decision making process, which resulted in the
suspension of Quinlanfs license, is unlawful within the meaning of
Section 63-46b-16(4)(e), Utah Code Ann.

The Commission's Orders

and the decision of the Director affirming those Orders must be set
aside.
VII.
Quinlan Was Denied Due Process Due To
Wrongful Ex Parte Communication
After the entry and adoption of the Commission Order, dated
November 3, 1993, Stephen Stewart, as the Director of the Division
of

Real

Estate,

sent

correspondence

to

Commission

members

requesting that a different, more detailed, order be adopted.

(R.

209) .
The Division, acting in is prosecutorial capacity, sought the
revocation of Quinlan's license.
The apparently successful ex parte

communication between the

prosecuting authority and members of the adjudicative body served
to deprive Quinlan of due process.

The participation

of an

advocate in the process of deliberation mandates a reversal of the
Commission's Orders and the Order of the Executive Director.
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As noted by the Court in Stein
Massachusetts,

Inc.,

vs.

Mutuel

Clerk's

Guild

of

384 F.Supp. 444(D. Mass. 1974):

While lay proceedings cannot be held to the
due process standards required in a court of
law,
it offends notions of fundamental
fairness to have the prosecutor present and
taking an active part in the deliberations of
any fact finding tribunal. . . . Anyone
subject to such a practice could hardly be
blamed for doubting that he had been treated
fairly and impartially. (384 F.Supp. at 44849) .
Similarly, in Stigall
Fire

Retirement

Board,

vs.

Anchorage

Municipality

Police

and

718 P.2d 943 (Alaska 1986), the Court held

that an attorney cannot act as an advocate before an administrative
agency and also participate in the agency's deliberations.

(719

P.2d at 945).
Admittedly, the Division Director did not personally appear as
counsel for the Division at the hearing before the Administrative
Law Judge. However, it is the Division of which he is the Director
which instituted this proceeding and which sought revocation of
Quinlan's

license.

The

Director's

participation

in

the

deliberation process, especially his communication with Commission
members for the purpose of requesting the issuance of a second
revised Order, violates due process.
For this additional reason, the Orders of the Commission and
the Director must be vacated and set aside.

32

CONCLUSION
The Orders of the Commission, dated November 3, 1993, and
December 3, 1993, and the Order on Review Denying Oral Argument
issued by the Director of the Department should each be vacated for
the following reasons:
1.

The agency decision is unlawful and unconstitutional in

that Quinlan was denied due process of law because the Division
Director

improperly

communicated

with

the

Commission

in

its

deliberative process and Quinlan was not afforded a full hearing
before the Commission;
2.

The Commission's Orders are arbitrary and capricious and

are not supported
decision

is

not

by substantial
consistent

with

evidence because the agency
the

Findings

of

Fact

and

Conclusions of Law adopted by the Commission;
3.

The Commission's Order, dated December 3, 1993, is void

because the Commission had previously entered and issued an Order
dated November 3, 1993;
4.

The Commission's Order, dated November 3, 1993, does not

include a statement of the reasons for the Commission's decision;
5.

The agency decision is contrary to, and inconsistent

with, its prior practice, and the Commission has failed to provide
a rational basis for that inconsistency;
6.

The agency decision is based on a policy not adopted in
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accordance with the Administrative

Rule

Making

Act.

Therefore,

that policy may not form a basis for the Commission's decision.
Respectfully submitted this

day of August, 1994.
CROWTHER & REED

>ed
irdner
for Petitioner
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This is to certify that on the

,3

day of August, 1994, a

true and correct copy of the foregoing Brief of Petitioner was hand
delivered to:
Lynn Nicholas
Assistant Attorney General
Consumer Rights Division
Attorney for Respondent
111 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0810
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ADDENDUM I

BEFORE THE DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

In the Matter of the License of
Orion Dale Quinlan to Act as a
Real Estate Sales Agent

:
:

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW AND RECOMMENDED ORDER
Case No. RE93-03-18

Appearances:
Robert E. Steed for the Division of Real Estate
Larry G. Reed for Respondent
By the Administrative Law Judge:
Pursuant to notice duly served by certified mail, a hearing was conducted in the aboveentitled matter on October 18, 1993 before J. Steven Eklund, Administrative Law Judge for
the Department of Commerce. Thereafter, evidence was offered and received.
The Administrative Law Judge, being fully advised in the premises, now submits the
following Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Recommended Order for review and
action by the Utah Real Estate Commission and the Director of the Division of Real Estate:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. Respondent is, and at all time relevant to this proceeding has been, licensed to
practice as a sales agent in this state. Respondent was employed in various positions at Hill
Air Force Base on a full-time basis for thirty-eight (38) years. He retired in September 1990.
Respondent initially obtained his sales agent license approximately twenty-five (25) years ago
and he owned Investment Realty from May 1965 until September 1971.
2. Respondent has been previously affiliated with Referral Realty Inc., he became
affiliated with Wardley Better Homes & Gardens in September 1992 and he presently
specializes in transactions which involve low income families through the Utah State Housing
Program. Respondent's principal broker is Mr. Steve Goff. This record does not reflect the
extent of Respondent's prior experience in commercial and residential transactions or property
management.
3. On July 9. 1992. Respondent pled guilty to one count of mail fraud in United States

District Couit proceedings. The Court suspended imposition of sentence relative to any
prison term and placed Respondent on probation for five (5) years The Court further ordered
Respondent: (1) be restricted to home confinement for 120 days, commencing July 27, 1992;
(2) pay $20,600 in restitution to Transamerica Insurance Company via payments of at least
$350 per month, commencing September 1992; (3) perform 50 hours of community service at
the rate of 25 hours per year; and (4) immediately pay a $50 victim assessment fee.
4. Respondent's conviction was prompted by unlawful conduct which occurred during
1988 and 1989. Sparing detail, Respondent operated a Tunex franchise which subsequently
encountered financial difficulties that prompted bankruptcy proceedings. He falsely
represented to Zions Leasing Company that he had purchased a diagnostic engine analyzer for
use in the Tunex business and Zions Leasing Company provided financing for that alleged
purchase. Respondent filed a police report and insurance claim, whereby he falsely
represented the theft of the analyzer on September 16, 1988. Transamerica Insurance
Company made payment totalling $25,204 as a result of Respondent's false representation. A
portion of the just-stated funds were paid to Respondent and the balance was paid to Zions
Credit Corporation. In fact, Respondent had never purchased or owned the analyzer which he
claimed had been stolen.
5. Respondent's sales agent license was scheduled for renewal on or before September
30, 1992. Respondent filed a renewal form with the Division on August 29, 1992. The form
contained two inquiries: (1) whether any final judgment had been rendered against
Respondent "as a result of any real estate transaction to which you were a party" during the
past two years; and (2) whether Respondent had "been convicted of a criminal offense in the
past two years". Respondent answered "no" in each instance. His answer to the second
question was based on his belief the question only pertained to any conviction of a criminal
offense related to a real estate transaction.
6. Given the unambiguous language of the second question on the renewal form, the
potential and foreseeable consequences of an affirmative answer to that question and the
somewhat self-serving nature of Respondent's testimony in this proceeding, Respondent's
belief as to the nature and scope of the question was not reasonable. Based on the foregoing
findings, the Court further finds Respondent intentionally misrepresented the fact of his prior
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criminal conviction when he completed the renewal form. Given the inferences which may
be properly drawn from the evidence presented, the Division renewed Respondent's license in
reliance on the truthfulness of his response to that question on the renewal form.
7. There is no evidence Respondent has engaged in other fraudulent conduct. He was
not acting as a real estate agent when he engaged in the conduct which led to his criminal
conviction. There is also no evidence he has been involved in other criminal activity or he
has acted in any unprofessional manner relative to conduct undertaken as a real estate sales
agent since being licensed in that capacity.
8. Respondent has complied with every requirement of his criminal probation to the
present time. Specifically, he has made timely monthly payments toward the eventual
satisfaction of the restitution to be paid. Respondent's principal broker is aware of
Respondent's status as a convicted felon. Similar to other agents affiliated with Wardley
Better Homes & Gardens, Respondent has no access to client funds in his practice as a sales
agent.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Utah Code Ann., Section 61-2-11 provides the Commission, with the concurrence of
the Division Director, may revoke, suspend, place on probation or deny reissuance of any
license if the licensee, whether acting as an agent or on his own account, is found guilty of:
(1) making any substantial misrepresentation;
(12) conviction of a criminal offense involving moral turpitude.
The Division asserts Respondent made a substantial misrepresentation as to the fact of his
prior criminal conviction when he sought renewal of his sales agent license. The Division
further asserts Respondent has been convicted of a criminal offense involving moral turpitude
and thus urges his license should be revoked.
Respondent concedes his conviction represents a crime involving moral turpitude.
However, he contends Sections 61-2-11(1) and (12) are not applicable unless the substantial
misrepresentation was made in a real estate transaction or the conviction of a criminal offense
occurred relative to a real estate transaction. Given the nature of his conduct, Respondent
thus asserts no basis exists to enter any disciplinary sanction as to his license. In the
alternative, Respondent urges that probation-rather than suspension or revocation—is the only
3

appropriate action wan anted in this proceeding
Statutes similar to Section 61-2-1 I have been enacted to protect the public from
unscrupulous and dishonest real estate licensees and the purpose of such statutes is to guard
against fraudulent real estate piactices

See Pearl v Florida Board of Real Estate, Fla App ,

364 So 2d 189, 192 (1982) Those who deal with real estate sales agents have an
unquestioned nght to expect such licensed individuals will consistently act with mtegnty and
in a completely honest and ethical manner

In re Goodman (Case #RE92-03-19, issued

October 14, 1992).
Significantly, Section 61-2-11 was amended in 1987. The previously-existing statute
read as follows*
The commission . . . may . . . suspend, revoke, place on probation, or deny
reissuance of any license issued under this chapter at any time if the licensee has
by false or fraudulent representation obtained a license, or if the licensee in
performing or attempting to perform any of the acts specified in this chapter is
found guilty of

(Emphasis added )

When Section 61-2-11 was so amended, the just-quoted italicized language was deleted from
that statute. Thus, Section 61-2-1 i no longer expressly authorizes the entry of a disciplinary
sanction when a licensee has obtained a license based on a "false or fraudulent representation"
submitted to the Division in a license application or renewal form.
Given the broad language of Section 61-2-11(1), it appears the first phrase of the justquoted prefatory language in Section 61-2-11 was deleted as redundant The Court further
notes Section 61-2b-29(l) and (3), which are companion statutes regulating the practice of
real estate appraising These statutes distinctly and clearly provide for disciplinary action
when a "material misrepresentation" is made "m an application filed with the division" or
when any misrepresentation occurs relative to "an act or omission in the practice of real estate
appraising " While Section 61-2-11 may not be a model of clarity, both the legislative history
and the more reasonable construction of that statute compels the conclusion that Section 61-211(1) applies m this proceeding and provides a proper basis to enter a disciplinary sanction as
to Respondent's license
Moreover, the deletion of the second phrase in the prefatory language of Section 61-211 "significantly broaden[ed] the applicability of the statute", whereby entry of a disciplinary
sanction would no longer be predicated on whether the underlying conduct was performed
4

with reference to acts undertaken as a licensee". In re McKee (Case #RE88-09-I2, issued
June 16, 1989). That amendment to Section 61-2-11 clearly reflects the legislative intent that
the scope of the statute be expanded to adequately protect the public interest. In re McKee,
supra.
The Court notes Respondent's urgence that Section 61-2-11(12) was again amended,
effective May 3, 1993, and now provides that conviction of a criminal offense involving
moral turpitude may prompt a disciplinary sanction "regardless of whether the crime was
related to real estate". Based on the legislative history of Section 61-2-11 and the manner in
which the Commission has applied that statute in prior disciplinary proceedings, the Court
rejects Respondent's assertion that Sections 61-2-11(1) and (12) must relate to conduct
undertaken in a real estate transaction. The 1993 amendment of Section 61-2-11(12) merely
underscores the prior 1987 amendment of Section 61-2-11 and affirms the manner in which
that statute has been applied subsequent to the 1987 amendment
The remaining issue is the appropriate disciplinary sanction to be entered, based on due
consideration of any aggravating or mitigating circumstances to thus assess the extent to
which Respondent's conviction "is adversely reflective of his ability to properly discharge
duties performed by a licensee". In re McKee, supra. Section 61-2-11(12) has prompted the
entry of various disciplinary sanctions in other proceedings before the Commission. In re
Pewitt (Case #RE86-06-33, issued January 14, 1987) involved a licensee employed by a bank
as a foreclosure specialist, who was convicted of theft of funds payable to his employer which
he had deposited, without authorization, in his own account That case contains the following
language:
Relative to the entry of a sanction in the instant case, it should be noted that
Respondent's illegal conduct involved large amounts of monies and that said
conduct was relatively lengthy in duration and of a highly serious nature.
Concededly, Respondent was subject to criminal prosecution, ordered to pay
restitution, and has financially suffered as a consequence. Respondent's
reputation has also been damaged to a significant extent and it is duly recognized
that loss of his licensure as a real estate sales agent will preclude his
employment in that respect and may operate to restrict his ability to satisfy
probationary terms and conditions relative to the previously-entered judgment
Nevertheless, Respondent's present situation is one occasioned by his own
actions. Absent evidence of some mitigating circumstances, an appropriately
severe sanction should be entered.
5

Mr. Pewitt's license to practice as a sales agent was thus revoked.
The license of another sales agent was also revoked, based on two convictions of wire
fraud, relative to the licensee's participation in a real estate development project and the
diversion of substantial amounts of monies from the construction loan relative to that project
In re Gleason (Case #RE87-04-07, issued July 13, 1988). The license of a principal broker
who had been convicted of rape and supplying alcoholic beverages to minors was suspended
during the term of his criminal probation. In re McKee, supra. In that case, no discernible
relationship existed between the conduct which prompted those convictions and the licensee's
status as a sales agent However, the license was suspended until the licensee's release from
criminal probation to thus "represent a measured evaluation of the need to protect the public
and generally maintain the integrity of the real estate profession". In re McKee, supra.
More recent cases have prompted the Commission to place licensees on probation. In
re Hutchinson (Case #RE91-03-04, issued November 20, 1991) involved a licensee who had
been convicted of making a corrupt offer to a bank officer.

Mr. Hutchinson had served a

four month term of incarceration in a community treatment center and he had been placed on
criminal probation for three years. Another licensee was convicted of attempted forgery, a
stay of enforcement had been entered on a twelve month county jail term and he was placed
on criminal probation for eighteen months- In re O'Brien (Case #RE90-11-23, issued January
17, 1992). Most recently, the license of a sales agent was placed on probation after that
licensee had been twice convicted of securities fraud, placed on criminal probation for three
(3) years on each occasion, ordered to pay fines totalling $7,500, required to pay restitution
totalling $3,362 and complete 150 hours of community service. In re Goodman, supra.
Respondent's prior criminal conduct is inexcusable and raises a substantial question as
to his honesty and integrity. It further appears he obtained some financial gain, albeit
indirect, as a consequence of his fraudulent misconduct. Significantly, none of the other
disciplinary proceedings referenced herein included an aggravating circumstance present in the
instant case. The Court duly notes Respondent failed to disclose the fact of his conviction
when he sought the renewal of his license. While somewhat understandable, Respondent's
lack of candor in that regard is nevertheless troublesome. Simply put, the Division must be
able to rely on representations made by licensees as to their current status and qualifications
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for any renewal of their licensure. Had Respondent accurately answered the second inquiry
on the license renewal form, appropriate action could have been taken with regard to any
renewal of his license at that time.
However, the instant case presents many mitigating circumstances similar to the
Hutchinson, O'Brien and Goodman cases. Significantly, Respondent continues to diligently
satisfy existing probationary terms with respect to his conviction. Respondent's criminal
conviction did not arise from conduct which he undertook while practicing as a real estate
sales agent and his status as a licensee did not facilitate that criminal conduct Moreover,
there is no evidence Respondent has engaged in any unprofessional conduct while acting in
any capacity as a sales agent Further, he has not been the subject of any complaints relative
to the manner in which he has provided services to others in his practice as a sales agent
It is arguable whether a short term suspension of Respondent's license is warranted.
However, no direct nexus exists between his criminal conduct and existing licensure through
the Division. There is no substantial basis to conclude Respondent will likely engage in
similar criminal misconduct in the future or that his ability to properly discharge duties
performed by a licensee has been measurably compromised by reason of his conviction.
Thus, the Court concludes the following Recommended Order will allow the
Commission and the Division to appropriately monitor Respondent's practice as a sales agent
as to adequately protect the public. Consistent with more recent cases decided by the
Commission and the Division, Respondent's sales agent license would likely have been placed
on probation approximately one year ago, had Respondent actually disclosed the fact of his
conviction when he sought the renewal of his license. While the Court concludes
Respondent's violation of Section 61-2-11(1) has been established by reason of the substantial
misrepresentation he made during the renewal process, that factor does not support a further
conclusion that the disciplinary sanction in this proceeding should thus be enhanced. The
Court cautions Respondent that any failure to comply with the terms which govern his
licensure or any subsequent misconduct which reflects a failure to act with complete honesty
and integrity will likely prompt further proceedings and certainly jeopardize his ability to
maintain any continued licensure as a sales agent in this state.
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RECOMMENDED ORDER
WHEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that Respondent's license to practice as a real estate
sales agent shall be placed on probation, subject to the following terms and conditions:
(1) Respondent's licensure to practice as a real estate sales agent shall
remain on probation, concurrent with the duration of his existing
probation as to his federal mail fraud conviction.
(2) Respondent shall provide a written report to the Commission every six
months from his probation officer as to whether he has maintained full
compliance with the terms of his criminal probation. At such time
that Respondent's criminal probation may be terminated, the
Commission shall determine whether the probation as to Respondent's
licensure as a sales agent should also be terminated.
(3) Respondent's principal broker, and any principal broker with whom
Respondent may subsequently become affiliated as a sales agent
during such time his license is on probation, shall provide written
reports to the Commission every six (6) months. The reports shall
summarize the general nature of Respondent's practice as a sales agent
and whether his performance in that capacity has been satisfactory.
Respondent's principal broker shall disclose to the Commission any
concerns as to Respondent's conduct as a sales agent
Should Respondent fail to comply with the above-stated terms and conditions or otherwise
violate any statute or rule which governs his license to practice as a sales agent, further
proceedings shall be conducted and a determination made whether his license should be
suspended or revoked.
Dated this <ffi

day of October 1993.

rhinistrative Law Judge
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ADDENDUM I I

DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
STEVEN H. STEWART, DIRECTOR
160 EAST 3 00 SOUTH
P.O. BOX 45806
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84145-0806

BEFORE THE UTAH STATE REAL ESTATE COMMISSION
In the Matter of the License
Of ORION DALE QUINLAN to Act
as a Real Estate Sales Agent

ORDER
CASE NO. RE93-03-18

The foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are
hereby confirmed and adopted. The Recommended Order is not adopted
because it is inconsistent with the Utah Real Estate Commission's
policy

of

not

allowing

licensure

until

an

applicant

has

successfully completed probation and paid all restitution.

The

following Order, which shall become effective December 4, 1993/ is
entered instead of the Recommended Order:
IT IS ORDERED that Respondent's license to practice as a real
estate sales agent is suspended until such time as his criminal
probation is completed and all restitution paid.
Dated this 5

day of November, 1993.
UTAH REAL ESTATE COMMISSION

BE'TOTOLBERT

/^N VftttfinQDA*KC.

SIMONS,

JR^

CLAUDIA E. ASHBY

i The above Order is confirmed, Adopted and thus issued this
'K>-

day of

Nw(Z^(*>(lil

1993.

^—.

„

STEVEN H. STEWART, DIRECTOR
DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE
93-03-18.0

ADDENDUM III

DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
STEVEN H. STEWART, DIRECTOR
160 EAST 3 00 SOUTH
P.O. BOX 45806
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84145-0806

BEFORE THE UTAH STATE REAL ESTATE COMMISSION
In the Matter of the License
of ORION DALE QUINLAN to Act
as a Real Estate Sales Agent

ORDER
CASE NO. RE93-03-18

The foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are
hereby confirmed and adopted. The Utah Real Estate Commission (the
Commission) does not adopt the Recommended Order because of the
serious nature of Mr. Quinlan's conviction and the aggravating
circumstance of his intentional misrepresentation concerning the
conviction on his license renewal application.
The Commission notes the absence in this case of some of the
mitigating factors cited by the Court in In re Goodman (Case RE9203-19, issued October 14, 1992).

Referring to Mr. Goodman, the

Court stated at page 4 of the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law,
and Recommended Order:

"The Court is further impressed with the

applicant's testimony and demeanor during the instant hearing,
which reveals he candidly acknowledges his prior indiscretions,
recognizes the seriousness of his past misconduct and states he
will

scrupulously

behavior."

avoid

an

recurrence

of

such

inappropriate

The Court found that Mr. Goodman provided information

and fully cooperated with both state and federal authorities as to
other securities matters under investigation. Mr. Goodman had also

successfully completed his state probation and fully paid his
restitution and fines from the state conviction at the time of the
hearing although he was

still on probation

from the

federal

conviction and still making payments toward his fine in the federal
case.
The Commission distinguishes Mr. Quinlan's case from In re
Hutchinson

(Case RE91-03-04, issued November 20, 1991) because

there was no evidence that Mr. Hutchinson benefited

from his

criminal conduct, whereas Mr. Quinlan obtained financial gain as a
consequence of his criminal conduct.

Another mitigating factor

cited by the Court in In re Hutchinson which is lacking in this
case was the possibility that Mr. Hutchinson's criminal conduct may
have been preceded by an excessive consumption of alcohol.
The Commission distinguishes Mr. Quinlan's case from In re
O'Brien

(Case RE90-11-23, issued January 17, 1992) in that no

restitution was involved in Mr. O'Brien's case, and Mr. O'Brien had
satisfied his criminal probation to the extent that he was no
longer required to report to Adult Probation and Parole at the time
of the final Order.
The Commission further notes that its recent policy with
respect to initial applicants with criminal convictions has been to
deny licensure until all restitution has been paid and until
probation

or

parole

has

been

successfully

completed.

The

Commission concludes that it would fail to protect the public to
allow an individual who is already licensed to retain his license
and

practice

the

profession

when

an

applicant

in

similar

circumstances would not be issued a license and allowed to practice.

The Commission concludes therefore that it is in the public
interest to suspend Mr. Quinlan's license until such time as his
criminal

probation

is successfully

completed

and all

of his

restitution has been paid.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Orion Dale Quinlan's Utah real
estate license will be suspended beginning 30 days after the
issuance of this Order, and will remain on suspension until he
provides evidence to the Division of release from probation and
payment of all restitution.
DATED this

day of

, 1993.

UTAH REAL ESTATE COMMISSION

^fi^H TOLBERT

DAN C. SIMONS, JR.

CLAUDIA E. ASHBY

ROBERT H. ZIEGLER

R. CURT WEBB
The undersigned concurs with the foregoing Order this
day of
, 1993.

STEVEN H. STEWART, DIRECTOR
DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE
93-03-18.o
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The Commission concludes therefore that it is in the public

";;! interest to suspend Mr. Quinlan's license until such time as his
criminal

probation

is

successfully

completed

and all

of his

restitution has been paid.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Orion Dale Quinlan's Utah real
estate license will be suspended beginning 30 days after the
issuance of this Order, and will remain on suspension until he
provides evidence to the Division of release from probation and
payment of all restitution.
DATED this

day of

, 1993.

UTAH REAL ESTATE COMMISSION

BETH TOLBERT

m(Jvi^^)CLAUDIA-E. ASHBY

ROBERT H. ZIEGLER

R. CURT WEBB
The undersigned concurs with the foregoing Order this
day of
, 1993.

STEVEN H. STEWART, DIRECTOR
DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE
93-03-18.o

The Commission concludes therefore that it is in the public
interest to suspend Mr, Quinlan's license until such time as his
criminal

probation

is

successfully

completed

and all

of his

restitution has been paid.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Orion Dale Quinlan's Utah real
estate license will be suspended beginning 30 days after the
issuance of this Order, and will remain on suspension until he
provides evidence to the Division of release from probation and
payment of all restitution.
DATED this

day of

, 1993.

UTAH REAL ESTATE COMMISSION

BETH TOLBERT

DAN C. SIMONS, JR.

CLAUDIA E. A^HBY

r

ROBERT H. ZIEGLER

R. CURT WEBB
The undersigned concurs with the foregoing Order this
day of
, 1993.

STEVEN H. STEWART, DIRECTOR
DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE
93-03-18.o

The Commission concludes therefore that it is in the public
interest to suspend Mr. Quinlan's license until such time as his
criminal

probation

is successfully

completed

and all

of his

restitution has been paid.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Orion Dale Quinlan's Utah real
estate license will be suspended beginning 30 days after the
issuance of this Order, and will remain on suspension until he
provides evidence to the Division of release from probation and
payment of all restitution.
DATED this

day of

, 1993.

UTAH REAL ESTATE COMMISSION

BETH TOLBERT

DAN C. SIMONS, JR.

CLAUDIA E. ASHBY

•<3La ZIEG
v-\ •

ROBERT H.

R.

CURT WEBB

The undersigned concurs with the foregoing Order this
day of
, 1993.

STEVEN H. STEWART, DIRECTOR
DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE
93-03-18.o

£ 0"
The Commission concludes therefore that it is in the public
interest to suspend Mr. Quinlan's license until such time as his
criminal probation

is successfully

completed

and all of his

restitution has been paid.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Orion Dale Quinlan's Utah real
estate license will be suspended beginning 30 days after the
issuance of this Order, and will remain on suspension until he
provides evidence to the Division of release from probation and
payment of all restitution.
DATED this

day of

, 1993.
UTAH REAL ESTATE COMMISSION

BETH TOLBERT

DAN C. SIMONS, JR.

CLAUDIA E. ASHBY

ROBERT H. ZIEG^BR

•"£. CURtf WEBB
The undersigned concurs with the/foregoing Order this
day of
, 1993. '

STEVEN H. STEWART, DIRECTOR
DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE
93-03-18.o

The Commission concludes therefore that it is in the public
interest to suspend Mr. Qumlan's license until such time as his
criminal

probation

is

successfully

completed

and all

of his

restitution has been paid.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Orion Dale Quinlan's Utah real
estate license will be suspended beginning 30 days after the
issuance of this Order, and will remain on suspension until he
provides evidence to the Division of release from probation and
payment of all restitution.
DATED this

day of

, 1993.

UTAH REAL ESTATE COMMISSION

BETH TOLBERT

DAN C. SIMONS, JR.

CLAUDIA E. ASHBY

ROBERT H. ZIEGLER

R. CURT WEBB
The undersigned concurs with the foregoing Order this
day of
kx^z^S^,
, 1993.

> -—

STEVEN H. STEWART, DIRECTOR
DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE
93-03-18.o

ADDENDUM I V

BEFORE THE
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF THE LICENSE OF
ORION DALE QUINLAN TO ACT AS
A REAL ESTATE SALES AGENT

ORDER ON REVIEW
DENYING ORAL ARGUMENT
Case No. RE93-03-18

INTRODUCTION
This matter comes before the Executive Director on the request for agency review
submiiieu oy Orion Dale Quinlan (Petitioner). The Division of Real Estate (Division) suspended
Petitioner's license to practice as a sales agent shortly following the renewal of that license in
August of 1992. After various proceedings, as is more fully set forth below, Petitionerfiledthis
request for agency review on January 14, 1994. The Division filed a responsive brief on February
14, 1994.
STATUTES OR RULES PERMITTING OR REQUIRING REVIEW
Agency review of the Division's decision is conducted pursuant to Section 63-46b-12,
Utah Code Annotated, and Rule Rl 51-46b-13 of the Utah Administrative Code.
ISSUES REVIEWED
1.
discretion.

Whether the Order was arbitrary and capricious or otherwise an abuse of

FINDINGS OF FACT
The findings of fact recommended by the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) on October 29,
1993, as adopted by the Commission, are not disputed by the parties. Therefore, the same
findings of fact are adopted for purposes of this review A partial summary of these facts follows
with additional findings adopted by the Executive Director*
1.

On July 9, 1992, Petitioner entered a plea of guilty to a charge of mail fraud in

connection with a transaction unrelated to his conduct as a real estate licensee. During August of
1992, Petitioner applied to the Division for renewal of his license, indicating on the renewal
application that he had not been convicted of a criminal offense within the preceding two years.
2.

Following the renewal of Petitioner's license, the Division learned of Petitioner's

conviction and the inaccuracy of his response on the renewal application. The Division
commenced agency action against Petitioner's license on April 13, 1993. A hearing was
conducted on October 18, 1993, following which the ALJ issued findings of fact, conclusions of
law, and a recommended order. The ALJ recommended that Petitioner's license be placed on
probation, concurrent with the probation imposed by the court.
3.

The Division Director and the Commission signed an Order on November 3, 1993,

adopting the recommended findings and conclusions of the ALJ, but not adopting the
recommended order. Instead of probation as recommended, the Director and Commission
ordered suspension of Petitioner's license
5.

On December 3, 1993, the Director and Commission modified the November 3,

1993, Order by adding a fuller explanation as to why they did not adopt the ALPs recommended
order of probation.
2

6.

The November 3, 1993, Order was signed by the Director and the Commission,

but was not mailed to Petitioner. Nor, evidently was it made public. The December 3, 1993,
Order was both signed by the Director and the Commission and mailed to Petitioner.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Utah Code Section 61-2-11 states:
The commission, with the concurrence of the director [of the Division of Real
Estate], may . . . suspend [a license if the licensee] is found guilty of:
(1) making any substantial misrepresentation;
*

*

*

(12) conviction of a criminal offense involving moral turpitude;
This section clearly supports the Commission's and the Director's Order suspending
Petitioner's license.. Paragraphs 3 and 4 of the AUTsfindingsof fact indicate that Petitioner had
been convicted of mailfraud,a crime involving moral turpitude. Paragraph 6 of the ALTs
findings of fact states that Petitioner's negative response to the application question whether he
had been "convicted of a criminal offense in the past two years" was not reasonable, and that
consequently, Petitioner had intentionally misrepresented the facts of his conviction on his
application. Thesefindingsand the law clearly uphold the suspension of Petitioner's license. In
that respect, the Order was within the Commission's authority and supported by law, and
therefore, not arbitrary and capricious.
In addition, this Subsection indicates that the Commission and the Director have the
discretion to impose the sanction for cause shown. The Commission and the Director were not
obligated to adopt thefindingsand conclusions of the ALJ, nor were they compelled to adopt his
recommended order or the reasoning upon which it was based. Ifindthat the Commission and
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the Director articulated reasonable grounds, supported by the record, for rejecting the
recommended order.
Since the Commission and the Director are granted discretion to suspend Petitioner's
license in this case, an analysis of their Order must determine whether they abused that discretion.
An abuse of discretion would result if the sanction imposed were found to be beyond the scope of
the statute or to be inconsistent with the prior decisions of the Commission and the Director. As
stated, the sanction — suspension — is allowable under the law. Therefore, the main inquiry is
whether the sanction is unreasonable or inconsistent with the Commission's prior practices.
Review of the December 3, 1993, Order and the cases comparing Petitioner's punishment
indicates that the Order is not inconsistent with other prior recent cases.
2.

With respect to the issue of whether the Commission and the Division can, should,

or must base its order on whether or not Petitioner has served probation is not relevant to this
case. Petitioner's license was suspended because of the recent felony conviction and because of
misrepresentation. However, I do note that Division Rule R162-2.2.7 does state that whether
restitution and probation have been completed is a factor which may be considered. That rule
applies to "applicants"; whether that term includes more than first-time applicants is not clear.
Although the point may not be relevant here, it perhaps should be clarified by the Division and
Commission. In this case, Petitioner's suspension is to last until he completes probation. That is a
reasonable use of the discretion which the Commission and the Division have in placing licensees
on probation or suspension.
3.

Petitioner suggests that the Commission was improperly influenced by Division

staff regarding the form of the December 3, 1993, Order, resulting in a denial of due process. I
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find that there is no appearance of a due process violation in this case The only variation
between the November Order and the December Order was the articulation of the factual basis for
the sanction imposed and the comparison of prior cases Both Orders suspended Petitioner's
license Both Orders adopted the facts and conclusion determined by the ALJ The December
version articulated the reasoning of the Commission beyond the November Order Had there
been a different result in the December Order, the inference of improper communication might be
considered, but that is not the case. Also, Petitioner has no support or proof of the allegation.
ORDER
Consistent with the preceding analysis, the Commission's Order of December 3, 1993,
suspending Petitioner's license, is upheld in its entirety. Effective immediately, Petitioner's license
is suspended for the duration of his probation with the federal court.
Dated this 25th day of March 1994

Constance B White, Executive Director
Department of Commerce

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL
Judicial review of this Order may be obtained by filing a Petition for Review with the
Court of Appeals within 30 days after the issuance of this Order on Review. Any Petition for
Review must comply with the requirements of Sections 63-46b-14 and 63-46b-16, Utah Code
Annotated
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that on the 25th day of March 1994,1 caused to be mailed a true and correct
copy of the foregoing Order on Review, properly addressed, postage prepaid, to:
Larry G. Reed
Bret A. Gardner
Crowther & Reed
Attorneys for Petitioner
455 South 300 East, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Robert E. Steed
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for Division
111 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
and caused a copy to be hand-delivered to:
Steven Stewart, Director
Division of Real Estate
160 East 300 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
\

c^ r <
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ADDENDUM V

BEFORE THE DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

In the Matter of the Application of
Rodney G. Goodman to Renew his
Real Estate Sales Agent License

:
:
:

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF
LAW AND RECOMMENDED ORDER
Case No. RE92-03-19

Appearances:
Robert Steed for the Division of Real Estate
Bster Stirba for the Applicant
By the Administrative Law Judge:
Pursuant to notice duly served by regular mail, a hearing was conducted in the aboveentitled matter on September 11, 1992 before J. Steven Eklund, Administrative Law Judge for
the Department of Commerce. Thereafter, evidence was offered and received.
The Administrative Law Judge, being fully advised in the premises, now submits the
following Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Recommended Order for review by the
Real Estate Commission and the Director of the Division of Real Estate:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The applicant was initially licensed to practice as a real estate sales agent in the

State of Utah sometime in 1982. The applicant was thereafter sporadically engaged in a real
estate practice, his license subsequently lapsed, he later reapplied for a similar license -and
was again so licensed in 1990. The applicant was actively engaged in the practice of real
estate during the next 18-24 months. In May 1990, he successfully completed the
examination for licensure as a principal broker and thereafter applied for such a license.
2.

On August 3, 1990, the applicant pled guilty to one count of securities fraud in

Third District Court proceedings. He was placed on probation for 36 months and ordered to
pay a $2,500 fine and restitution totalling $3,362. On August 8, 1990, the Commission and
Division conducted a hearing as to the applicant's request for licensure as a principal broker.
The application was denied based on the just-described conviction.
3.

On January 30, 1992, the applicant sought renewal of his sales agent license. The

application was not processed because he did not submit proof he had completed mandatory

continuing education requirements and had further indicated he had been convicted of a
criminal offense in the last two years. The applicant was contacted by Division staff, at
which time he disclosed his guilty plea to a securities fraud conviction in another case.
Specifically, the applicant pled guilty to one count of securities fraud in United States District
Court proceedings. Said judgment was entered January 31, 1992. The applicant was
sentenced to serve a three (3) year prison term, the Court suspended any execution of that
sentence and placed the applicant on probation for three (3) years, ordered him to pay a
$5,000 fine and also complete 150 hours of community service.
4.

The applicant's convictions for securities fraud were prompted by separate

instances of unlawful conduct which occurred sometime between 1985 and 1987. The
applicant provided information and fully cooperated with both state and federal authorities as
to other securities matters under investigation. He has paid both the fine and restitution
entered in the state court proceeding and his probation was terminated in August 1992. The
applicant has made timely payments—to date—toward the fine which was imposed by reason
of his conviction in the federal court proceeding. He has also completed 75 hours of the
community service required incident to the sentence imposed in that proceeding.
5.

There is no evidence the applicant has been engaged in other fraudulent conduct

He was not acting as a real estate sales agent when he engaged in the conduct which led to
his criminal convictions. There is also no evidence he has been involved in other criminal
activity or has acted in any unprofessional manner relative to conduct undertaken as a real
estate sales agent subsequent to being licensed in that capacity.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Utah Code Ann., Section 61-2-11(12) provides the Commission, with the concurrence of
the Division Director, may deny reissuance of any license if the licensee, whether acting as an
agent or on his own account, is convicted of a criminal offense involving moral turpitude.
The applicant acknowledges his convictions reflect serious instances of unlawful conduct
However, he urges certain mitigating factors exist and requests his application for renewal of
a sales agent license be granted, possibly subject to certain restrictions.
The term "moral turpitude" has often been defined as "inherent baseness or depravity in
the private social relations or duties by man to man or by man to society". Pearl v. Florida
Board of Real Estate, Fla. App, 394 So.2d 189, 191 (1981). Whether criminal conduct
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involves moral turpitude depends on the inherent nature of the crime itself rather than
circumstances surrounding the particular transgression. Okabe v. Immigration and
Naturalization Service, 617 F.2d 863 (1982). Generally, all crimes of which fraud is an
element are considered to involve moral turpitude. Moretti v. State Board of Pharmacy, 2 Pa.
Cmwlth. 121, 277 A.2d 516, 518 (1971); Iowa State Bar Ass'n v. Kraschel, 148 N.W.2d 621,
627 (1967). In Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223 (1951), the United States Supreme Court
stated as follows:
Whatever else the phrase "crime involving moral turpitude" may mean in
peripheral cases, the decided cases make it plain that crimes in which fraud was an
ingredient have always been regarding as involving moral turpitude . . ." Fraud is
the touchtone by which this case should be judged. The phrase "crime involving
moral turpitude" has without exception been construed to embrace fraudulent
conduct. Id at 232.
Certain courts have applied the following test:
Conviction of some crimes establishes moral turpitude on its face. These
include crimes that necessarily involve an intent to defraud or intentional
dishonesty for the purpose of personal gain
In re Fahey, 106 CaLRptr. 313, 505 R2d 1369, 1373 (1973); Howard v. Nicholls, 111 Ariz.
383, 621 P.2d 292, 297 (1980); In re Strict 238 Cal Rptr. 397, 738 P.2d 743, 749 (1987); In
re Kelley, 276 CaLRptr. 375, 801 P.2d 1126, 1130 (1990). Courts have stated convictions
involving forgery, extortion, bribery, robbery, embezzlement and other forms of theft clearly
involve moral turpitude. In re Rothrock, 16 Cal.2d 449, 106 P.2d 907 (1940). Morasch v.
Immigration and Naturalization Service, 363 F.2d 30, 31 (1966).
The nature of the applicant's convictions clearly reflect he committed crimes involving
moral turpitude. Thus, a sufficient basis exists to possibly deny the applicant's request to
renew his sales agent license. Statutes similar to Section 61-2-11(12) have been enacted to
protect the public from unscrupulous and dishonest real estate licensees and the purpose of
such statutes is to guard against fraudulent real estate practices. Pearl v. Florida Board of
Real Estate, supra, at 192. Those who deal with real estate sales agents have an unquestioned
right to expect such licensed individuals will consistently act with integrity and in a
completely honest and ethical manner.
The applicant's prior misconduct was inexcusable and raises a substantial question as to
his personal integrity. He engaged in such unlawful conduct as motivated by his desire for
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personal gain. Significantly, the state court conviction reflects financial injury occurred due
to the applicant's misconduct Nevertheless, various mitigating factors suggest it would be
appropriate to renew the applicant's sales agent license, subject to certain rigorous
probationary terms. Neither of the applicant's convictions were occasioned by conduct he
undertook as a licensed real estate sales agent

Commendably, he has diligentiy satisfied all

probationary terms with respect to the state court conviction and his probation in that respect
has been terminated. This Court is further impressed with the applicant's testimony and
demeanor during the instant hearing, which reveals he candidly acknowledges his prior
indiscretions, recognizes the seriousness of his past misconduct and states he will
scrupulously avoid any recurrence of such inappropriate behavior.
The applicant has only maintained an active practice as a real estate sales agent for a
relatively brief time. However, the Court duly notes there is no evidence he has engaged in
any unprofessional conduct while acting in any capacity as a sales agent and he has not been
the subject of any complaints relative to the manner in which he has provided services to
others in his practice as a sales agent The Court concludes the following Recommended
Order will allow the Commission and the Division to appropriately monitor the applicant's
practice as a sales agent as to adequately protect the public. The Court cautions the applicant
that any failure to comply with the terms governing his licensure or any subsequent
misconduct reflecting a failure to act with complete honesty and integrity as a sales agent will
likely prompt further proceedings and certainly jeopardize his ability to maintain any
continued licensure as a sales agent in this state.
RECOMMENDED ORDER
WHEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED the applicant's request to renew his license as a real
estate sales agent in the State of Utah be granted. Such license shall be issued, subject to the
following probationary terms and conditions:
(1) Prior to any renewal of the applicant's license, he shall
duly provide the Division with adequate documentation he
has completed all mandatory continuing education
requirements.
(2) The applicant's license to practice as a real estate sales agent shall
remain on probation, concurrent with the duration of his existing
probation with respect to his federal securities fraud conviction.
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(3) Ilie applicant shall meet with the Commission eu-iy sis >)
months for the duration of the probationary term set forth hci "n.
Prior to each meeting, a written report, shall be provided i-> : i ^
Commission from the applicant's probation officer as to whedier he
has maintained full compliance with the terms of his criminal
probation. At such time the applicant's criminal probation ma\ \H:
terminated, the Commission shall determine whether the probation as
* * """ applicant's licensure as a sales agent should also be terminated.
MI> principal, broker with whom the applicant may subsequently
become affiliated as a. sales agent shall provide written reports to the
Commission every six (6) months, said reports to be submitted
concurrent with the applicant's regularly scheduled meetings with the
Commission. The reports shall summarize the general nature of the
applicant's practice as a sales agent and whether his performance in
that capacity has been satisfactory. The applicant's principal broker
shall disclose to the Commission any concerns as to the applicant's
conduct as a sales agent
Should the appl icant .fail to comply with the above stated, terms and condidoi is 0.1:
otherwise violate any statute or rule which governs his lu ense • * practice a-^ a sales aj

t.

further proceedings shall be con.du.cted and a determination made whether his license si •u.J
be suspended, or revoked
Dated this

of October, 1992.
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BEFORE THE REAL ESTATE COMMISSION
OF THE UTAH DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

In the Matter of the Application of
Rodney Goodman to Renew his
Real Estate Sales Agent License

ORDER
CASE NO. RE92-03-19

The foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law dated
October 6, 1992 are approved and adopted. The Recommended Order of
the Administrative Law Judge is adopted, with the exception that
paragraph (3) of the recommended order will read as follows:
"(3) The applicant shall provide a written report to the
Commission every six months from his probation officer as to
whether he has maintained full compliance with the terms of
his criminal probation.
At such time as the applicant's
criminal probation may be terminated, the Commission shall
determine whether the probation as to the applicant's
licensure as a sales agent should also be terminated."
DATED this

(*H^

day of

Ocdhjkw

, 1992.

UTAH REAL ESTATE COMMISSION

PAUL NEUENSCHWANDER

BETTiTOLBERT

'

Hi
ROBERT H

7TFGT.EK

The abovQ Order is confirmed and approved V-v t he undersigned
/^^'
.
--1.V/ • f
0e//cJ0,~
, 1^2.
f^EyuJ^ii
6LAINE E. "TWITCHELL, DIRECTOR
DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE
92-03-19.o

ADDFMXM VI

BEFORE THE DIVISION OF REAL ESI ATE
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
OF

TOE

In the Matter of the License of
James HL Hutchinson to Act
as a Real Estate Sales Agent

UTAH

STATE 0 F

:
:
:

riMMNGS i)1 ; I i ;, M INCLUSIONS OF
L A u \x-l> RI < >MMENDED ORDER
Case No. RE-91-03-04

Appearances:
David W. Lund for the Division of Real Estate
Jerome EL Mooney for Respondent
By the Administrative I .aw J udge:
IE ursuant to notice duly served by iq;»iikii: mail, a lieaiuig was condui

. ..e above-

entitled matter on June 13, lO'H before J, Steven Eklund,- Administrative Law Judge for the
Department of Commerce. Ilicreafter, evidence was offered and received.
The Administrative Law Judge, being folly advised in the premises, now submits the
following Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Recommended Order for review by the
Real Estate Commission and the Executive Director of the Department of Commerce:
FINDINGS OF FAC I '
1.

ku>pundci.: * „ i'-.

practice as a bale* agon

•

-. ^iii/s relevant t'Wiv,* .
* :.

, uuip M,I

,-n incused to

* 1 *ah. Respondent becaim M> HOMISIV n " Vcember

1989 and ha^ been affiliated \Mtti three different principal biokei.,
Respondent has been affiliated with a Dan R Kannelh

v

nice Ou.-bei J990,

P ^ i n g h-* licensure .is a sales apent.

Respondent has experience in the sale of residential properties, typically those which involve
HUD and VA financing. Respondent has engaged in approximately 25 such transactions
since he obtained his license as a sales agent
2.

Respondent has applied for a -ic^n.v oi a j.:-nopal bi

proceeding wa:. init.a--J ruii>ii...., .v. itix: i^uoiix
dated , * • ' • ' ' •

- ^ —

; informed kr

^ . M .« •

.:

,. « jai
r -

;

,/:„M\

<n; u,u, an> „ ;,.,n <.n !a;> appkea* »

a principal broker's license would be held in abeyance pending the outcome of this
proceeding.
3.

On May 18, 1990, Respondent met a Jerome Gatto and was informed by Mr.

Gatto he was seeking financing to purchase a private club. Respondent subsequently
introduced Mr. Gatto to a Steve Peterson as to assist Mr. Gatto in his attempts to obtain a
loan. Sparing detail, Respondent and his wife, Mr. Peterson and his wife and a Paul
Matthews (who is a loan officer for Wasatch Bank) and his wife subsequently met in a social
setting at a private club. During the course of that evening, Respondent related to Mr.
Matthews that he (Respondent) had been informed Mr. Matthews would receive monies to
facilitate a loan for Mr. Gatto. Based on the undisputed and credible evidence presented
during the instant hearing, Respondent was likely intoxicated to some extent when that
conversation occurred. There is no evidence that Respondent would realize any financial
benefit from any transaction involving a loan to Mr. Gatto.
4.

Criminal proceedings were subsequently initiated in the United States District

Court for the District of Utah, whereby Respondent was charged with having made a corrupt
offer to a bank officer, a violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 215(a)(1). The criminal indictment in
that regard set forth the allegation that Respondent offered "money and services" if Mr.
Matthews "would cause the Wasatch Bank to make a loan" to Mr. Gatto. Respondent pled
guilty to the just-stated charge. On February 1, 1991, Respondent was sentenced on that
conviction. Specifically, the Court entered the following judgment:
The defendant is placed in the custody of the Bureau of Prisons
at the Community Treatment Center for a period of FOUR MONTHS
with TWENTY-FOUR (24) hour supervision. After confinement, the
defendant is placed on THREE (3) YEARS supervised release with
special conditions . . . . The defendant must report to the Community
Treatment Center by 12:00 noon on or before February 4, 1991. A
fine of ONE THOUSAND DOLLARS ($1,000) is imposed.
The Court further ordered as follows:
(1) The defendant must abide by all standard conditions of
supervised release and shall not violate any federal, state or local law.
(2) The defendant must engage in alcohol therapy as directed by the
United States Probation Office. (3) The defendant must submit to
random urinalysis as requested by the United States Probation Office.
(4) The defendant shall not associate in any way with Jerome Gatto-
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f ;•: i he defendant must pay the fine imposed prior to the end of
supervised release pursuant to a schedule by the IJ. S. Probation
Office.
On February 1^, \l)9\, Respnr..iem was o*mmiu<\i t»> tlv ("Vnunu /i1- IV-aun.';u ' Vnt*-.
was subsequent!1, discharged < ;. Juiv ^ I •"•.

!:e

I-Vspoiiwjut participated in an alcohol abu.v

treatment progiam Jurm;1 the ii:^t stated v:v.> While •; ^ -crimed. Respondent .satisfactorily
completed that program.
""he hearing in the instant proceeding was conducted ten (10) days after
Respondent's release from, the Community Treatment Center. The terms of Respondent's
criminal probation require that he meet with a probation officer between, the first and fifth, of
each month. As of the date of the hearing in this proceeding, Respondent ha-.' met once wi?h
his probation officer. This record does not reflect the nature lre*p IK ,
outpatient alcoholic treatment which Respondent ..— », ^ "

->n-

\„- no. .: ,..-.*

- w : - '••••', * w,w a^.'> - ot

subject to any urinalysis prior to the hearing in this matter
6 Respondent was not acting as a. real, estate sales agent when he engaged in the
conduct which led to his criminal conviction

There is no evidence Respondent has been

involved in other criminal,, activity or he has acted in any unprofessional, manner .relative to
conduct undertaken as a real estate sales agent subsequent to being licensed in that capacity.
CONCLUSIONS OF I AW
Section 61-2-11(! 1' Utah Code Ann \\-*^*
not to exceed $500 nuv

t

,-

- amended, pr .•;dc\. .ru. . . i \ . . penalty

*> icai esuu license^ - *- . -laced » -

obationary

status, suspend * ' • i^ -* *d *! "ir licensee, whether acting a^ an a *nt or o;\ in,, own
account, Is convicted of a criminal offense involving moral, turpitude. Respondent contends
he has not engaged in. conduct violative of 'the just-referenced statute, Given the nature of his
conduct and certain mitigating factors, Respondent alternatively urges 'that no basis exists to
revoke or suspend his license as a real estate agent
The terra "moral, turpitude"1 has often 'been defined as "inherent baseness or depravity in
the private social relations or duties owed by man to man or bj man to society" Pearl v.

condu- : t i nvolves moral turpitude depends on the inherent nature of the crime iteclf rather than
the circumstances surrounding the particular transgression. Okabe v. Immigration and
Naturalization Service, 61.7 F.2d 863 (1982)

Generally, all crimes of which, fraud, is an
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element are considered to involve moral turpitude. Moretti v. State Board of Pharmacy, 2 Pa.
Cmwlth. 121, 277 A.2d 516, 518 (1971); Iowa St. Bar Ass'n. v. Kraschel, 148 N.W. 2d 621,
627 (1967). In Jordan v. De George. 341 U.S. 223 (1951), the United States Supreme Court
stated as follows:
Whatever else the phrase "crime involving moral turpitude" may mean in
peripheral cases, the decided cases make it plain that crimes in which fraud was an
ingredient have always been regarded as involving moral turpitude. . . . Fraud is
the touchstone by which this case should be judged. The phrase "crime involving
moral turpitude" has without exception been construed to embrace fraudulent
conduct. Id. at 232.
Various courts have recognized that any crime of bribery involves moral turpitude. United
States v. Esperdy, 285 F.2d 341, 342 (2d Cir. 1961); Okabe v. Immigration and Naturalization
Service, supra. See comments in People v. Brandon, 218 Cal. Rptr. 909 (1986).
Respondent has engaged in serious criminal conduct While his conviction was not
occasioned by conduct he undertook as a licensed sales agent, the nature of the conviction
reflects that Respondent committed a crime involving moral turpitude. Thus, a proper basis
exists to enter a disciplinary sanction with regard to Respondent license as a sales agent. It
has been stated that statutes similar to Section 61-2-11(12) have been enacted to protect the
public from unscrupulous and dishonest real estate licensees and that the purpose of such
statutes is to guard against fraudulent real estate practices. Pearl v. Florida Board of Real
Estate, supra, at 192.
Significantly, Respondent's criminal conduct was not undertaken in furtherance of a real
estate transaction involving his participation as a licensee. Other mitigating factors also
compel the conclusion that Respondent's license should neither be revoked nor suspended.
There is no evidence Respondent obtained any financial benefit as a result of his criminal
conduct or that his status as a licensee facilitated the criminal conduct which occurred.
Rather, it appears that Respondent's misconduct occurred in a social setting and he had
introduced individuals previously known to either himself or his wife for the furtherance of a
financial transaction unrelated to his status as a licensee. Further, Respondent's criminal
conduct may have been preceded by an excessive consumption of alcohol.
The Court notes that Respondent was to commence an alcohol therapy program and
would be subject to random urinalysis, pursuant to the terms and conditions of his criminal
probation. This record does not reflect the nature of any rehabilitative treatment Respondent
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in1,

Ih'.'.ev^r. the* •'•iiii: .utiaih assumes that

Respondent nas vigilantly complied vwth the terms i>I his prohaUt.n .subsequent to his release

from the Community Treatment Center.
Based on the just-stated .assumption, and with due regard for the above-described
circumstances, an appropriate sanction should enter to monitor Respondent's continued
compliance with the requirements of his criminal probation and to reduce the possibility that
Respondent might subsequently engage in fraudulent miscondiu'
public health, safct

w< h ..

' a • .irdi.v

,e

*-*h - -fc m his capa,.;i\ t> a h. m v J ^K a^err.
<FCOM\lFNP! : P ORDER

WHEREFORE, 11 ..- - • DuRLD that Respondent's license to practice as a real estate
sales agent in the State of Utah shall be placed on probation, subject to the following terms
and conditions:
(1)

Respondent's .licensure as a sales agent shall remain on probation
concurrent with the duration of his criminal probation, subject to the
same terms and conditions which govern his criminal probation.

(2)

Respondent shall meet with the Real Estate Commission at the next
regularly scheduled Commission meeting after this Recommended
Order may be adopted by the Commission and the Executive Director
of the Department of Commerce. At Respondent's initial meeting
with the Commission, he shall provide documentation which reflects
the nature and frequency of his participation in an alcohol therapy
program subsequent to June 13, 1991, the date of the hearing in this
proceeding. Respondent shall also provide a written report from his
probation officer which reflects whether Respondent has complied
with the terms of his criminal probation, whether any urinalysis has
been conducted and the results of such testing.

(3)

If Respondent has satisfied the terms of 'his criminal probation to date
and he has regularly and continuously participated in an alcohol
therapy program, Respondent may continue to practice as a real estate
sales agent, subject to the terms and conditions set forth herein.

/A

Respondent shall meet with the Commission every six months. Prior
to each meeting, a written report shall be provided to the Commission
from Respondent's probation officer as to whether Respondent has
continued to comply with the terms of his criminal probation. If
Respondent's supervised criminal probation is terminated prior to the
expiration of three years from, the commencement of that probation,

)
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the Commission shall then determine whether to concurrently
terminate Respondent's probation regarding his licensure as a sales
agent
Should Respondent fail to comply with the terms and conditions set forth above, or
otherwise violate any statute or rule which governs his license to practice as a sales agent in
this state, further proceedings shall be conducted and a determination made whether a
sanction of greater severity than that set forth herein is warranted.
Dated this

of November, 1991.

f

3teven
nistrative Law Judge
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BEFORE THE DIVISION OF REAL EST/uE
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

In the Matter of the License of
James H. Hutchinson to Act
as a Real Estate Sales Agent

ORDER
Case No. RE-91-03-04

The foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Recommended Order are
hereby confirmed and adopted.
Dated this 2o+i^ day of November, 199L
UTAH REAL ESTATE COMMISSION:

William H. Coleman

* ^ / ^

Paul Neuenschwander

Beth.Tolbert

mi&ft'Vfo^
Dan C Simons, Jr.

audia E. Ashby
Claudia

ft

The above Order is hereby confirmed and approved by the undersigned this 2otiw day
of November, 1991.

Blaine E. Twitchell
Director, Division of Real Estate

Department of Commerce

BEFORE THE DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

In the Matter of the License of
James H. Hutchinson to Act
as a Real Estate Sales Agent

ORDER
Case No. RE-91-03-04

Pursuant to a November 20, 1991 Order, the Utah Real Estate Commission confirmed and
adopted the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Recommended Order entered in the
above-entitled proceeding. Upon review of the foregoing, notice is hereby given that the juststated order is confirmed and approved by the undersigned this ^ 7

day of November,

1991.

David L. Buhler, Executive Director
Department of Commerce

ADDENDUM VII

BEFORE THE DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

In the Matter of the Certification of
Gary O'Brien to Act as a
Real Estate Instructor and to Operate a
Real Estate School and the License of
Gary O'Brien to Act as a
Real Estate Broker

:
:
:
:
:
:

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF
LAW AND RECOMMENDED ORDER
Case No. RE90-11-23

Appearances:
David W. Lund for the Division of Real Estate
Gary O'Brien for Respondent
By the Administrative Law Judge:
Pursuant to notice duly served by regular mail, a hearing was conducted in the aboveentitled matter on September 6, 1991 before J. Steven Eklund, Administrative Law Judge for
the Department of Commerce. Thereafter, evidence was offered and received.
The Administrative Law Judge, being fully advised in the premises, now submits the
following Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Recommended Order for review by the
Real Estate Commission and the Director of the Division of Real Estate:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Respondent is, and at all times relevant to these proceedings has been, licensed to

practice as a principal broker in the State of Utah. Respondent became so licensed
approximately 5-8 years ago. Respondent has operated a real estate school since February
1979 and has been certified as a real estate instructor for approximately fourteen (14) years.
Respondent is only minimally active as a principal broker, most of his time being committed
to teaching and operating his real estate school. Respondent also periodically hires
independent contractors to teach at the school, which provides instruction for approximately
thirty (30) students per month.
2.

In early January 1990, Respondent decided to start a real estate school in Las

Vegas, Nevada. In order to obtain necessary financing for that business, Respondent and a
Peter Judd (also known as Alan K. Judd) entered a written agreement on January 11, 1990,
whereby Mr. Judd would loan Respondent $10,000. Respondent agreed to repay Mr. Judd
$1,000 per month, commencing March 1, 1990, for a period of twelve (12) months.
Respondent and Mr. Judd further agreed the former would pledge a boat as collateral for the
loan, Mr. Judd would be a second lien holder as to that boat and would hold title to that
property until such time as the loan had been repaid. Respondent and Mr. Judd also agreed
that the latter would receive 10% of net profits generated by the real estate school so long as
that school existed.
3.

Shortly after Respondent entered into the January 11, 1990 contract with Mr.

Judd, he became aware he did not possess any title to the boat In fact, no such evidence of
ownership was routinely issued for such personal property at that time. Since Mr. Judd had
requested that Respondent provide him with a title to the boat, Respondent prepared what
purported to be such a title. Specifically, Respondent used a certificate of title with regard to
an automobile he owned and he created what appeared to be a title which reflected Mr.
Judd's status as a second lien holder on the boat Respondent provided that document to Mr.
Judd when he (Respondent) received the $10,000 loan a few days after the contract had been
executed.
4.

Respondent subsequently made payments totalling $2,000 to Mr. Judd toward the

partial satisfaction of the loan. However, it appears the Nevada real estate school did not
generate the income Respondent had anticipated would be available to repay the loan. Mr.
Judd subsequently became aware of the counterfeit title Respondent had provided to him.
Approximately November 1990, Mr. Judd initiated a civil action against Respondent and also
filed a complaint with the Division and the Utah Department of Motor Vehicles.
5.

Third Circuit Court criminal proceedings were initiated on or about December 6,

1990, whereby Respondent was charged with the crime of False Evidence of Title and
Registration, a second degree felony. The criminal information in that regard set forth the
allegation that Respondent had:
(a)

Altered with fraudulent intent, any certificate of title, registration
card, registration plate or permit issued by the department.
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(b)

Forged or counterfeited any such document or plate purporting to
have been issued by the department.

(c)

Altered or falsified, with fraudulent intent, or forge any assignment
upon a certificate of title.

(d)

Held or used any such document or plate knowing the same to have
been altered, forged or falsified.

Respondent initially entered a not guilty plea as to the just-described charge. On May 20,
1991, Respondent withdrew that plea and then pled guilty to the offense of attempted forgery,
a Class A misdemeanor. Respondent was sentenced to a twelve (12) month term in the Salt
Lake County Jail, ordered to pay a $500 fine and surcharge and was also ordered to pay
restitution, the amount of which was to be determined by the Adult Probation and Parole
Division. A stay of enforcement was entered as to the just-described jail sentence and
Respondent was placed on probation for eighteen (18) months. In lieu of the fine and a $125
surcharge, Respondent was ordered to complete 100 hours of community service by
November 1, 1991.
6-

As of September 6, 1991, the date of hearing in the instant proceeding,

Respondent had completed twenty-five (25) hours of community service. Respondent
anticipated he would complete the remaining community service by November 1, 1991 and
his criminal probation could be terminated at that time. No amount of restitution has been
established and it appears possible no such restitution will be required. The litigation
between Mr. Judd and Respondent, which includes a countersuit by the latter, is still pending.
7.

Respondent was not acting as a real estate principal broker, a real estate instructor

or the operator of a real estate school in this state when he engaged in the conduct which
prompted his criminal conviction. There is no evidence Respondent has been involved in
other criminal activity or that he has acted in any unprofessional manner relative to conduct
undertaken in any of those capacities subsequent to being licensed or certified in that regard.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Section 61-2-11(12), Utah Code Ann. (1953), as amended, provides that a civil penalty
not to exceed $500 may be imposed or a real estate license may be placed on probationary
status, suspended or revoked if the licensee, whether acting as an agent or on his own
account, is convicted of a criminal offense involving moral turpitude. Respondent contends
he has not engaged in conduct violative of the just-referenced statute and he asserts that the
3

meaning of moral turpitude is vague, unclear and no statutes or rules define that term.
Respondent further asserts no basis exists to enter any disciplinary sanction as to his
certification as a real estate instructor or his status as the operator of a real estate school.
Given the nature of his conduct and certain mitigating factors, Respondent also urges that his
license as a real estate principal broker should not be revoked or suspended and entry of any
such sanction would be excessive, in light of action taken by the Division in other cases
involving a violation of Section 61-2-11(12).
Various courts have recognized that the "elusive concept" of moral turpitude has long
been the subject of judicial scrutiny. Rice v. Alcoholic Bev. Control Appeals Board, 89 Cal.
App.3d 30, 152 CaLRptr. 285, 288 (1979); Henry H. v. Board of Pension Commissioners, 149
Cal.App.3d 965, 197 CaLRptr. 636, 641 (1983). Courts have "grappled with the amorphous
term in a variety of factual contexts largely involving disciplinary proceedings" and have
conceded that the concept of moral turpitude "by nature defies any attempt at a uniform and
precise definition". Rice v. Alcoholic Bev. Control Appeals Board, supra, at 288-89, and
cases cited therein. However, it has also been held that the lack of a precise statutory
definition for the term "moral turpitude" does not render such a provision unenforceable,
Henry H v. Board of Pension Commissioners, supra.
Moral turpitude has often been generally defined as innerent baseness or depravity in
the private social relations or duties owed by man to man or by man to society". Pearl v.
Florida Board of Real Estate, Fla. App. 394 So.2d 189, 191 (1981). Whether criminal
conduct involves moral turpitude initially depends on the inherent nature of the crime itself
rather than the circumstances surrounding the particular transgression. Okabe v. Immigration
and Naturalization Service, 617 F.2d 863 (1982). Thus, certain courts have applied the
following test:
Conviction of some crimes establishes moral turpitude on its face. These
include crimes that necessarily involve an intent to defraud or intentional
dishonesty for the purpose of personal gain . . . . They may also include particular
crimes that are extremely repugnant to accepted moral standards such as murder . .
or serious sexual offenses . . . . There are other crimes the commission of which
may or may not involve moral turpitude; conviction of these is not ground for
discipline without additional proof of circumstances surrounding the offense.
In re Fahey, 106 CaLRptr. 313, 505 P.2d 1369, 1373 (1973). In re Strick, 238 CaLRptr. 397,
738 P.2d 743, 749 (1987);

In re Kelley, 276 CaLRptr. 375, 801 P.2d 1126, 1130 (1990).
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Generally, all crimes of which fraud is an element are considered to involve moral
turpitude. Moretti v. State Board of Pharmacy, 2 Pa. Cm with. 121, 277 A.2d 516, 518
(1971); Iowa St. Bar Ass'n v. Kraschel, 148 N.W.2d 621, 627 (1967). In those cases, "moral
turpitude" has thus been found when a fraudulent or dishonest intent exists, particularly when
undertaken for the purpose of personal gain. Howard v. Nicholls, 127 Ariz. 383, 621 P.2d
292, 297 (1980); In re Fahey, supra. In Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223 (1951), the
United States Supreme Court stated as follows:
Whatever else the phrase "crime involving moral turpitude" may mean in
peripheral cases, the decided cases make it plain that crimes in which fraud was an
ingredient have always been regarded as involving moral turpitude . . . . Fraud is
the touchstone by which this case should be judged. The phrase "crime involving
moral turpitude" has without exception been construed to embrace fraudulent
conduct Id. at 232.
Courts have stated that convictions involving forgery, extortion, bribery, robbery,
embezzlement and other forms of theft clearly involve moral turpitude. In re Rothrock, 16
Cal.2d 449, 106 P.2d 907 (1940). Morasch v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 363
F.2d 30, 31 (1966).
Respondent's conviction was not occasioned by conduct he undertook as a licensed
principal broker or certified real estate instructor. Importantly, his conviction bears no
relation whatever to the manner in which he has operated his real estate school. Nevertheless,
the nature of his conviction reflects that Respondent committed a crime involving moral
turpitude. Thus, a sufficient basis exists to enter a disciplinary sanction as to Respondent's
license as a principal broker and a certified real estate instructor. Statutes similar to Section
61-2-11(12) have been enacted to protect the public from unscrupulous and dishonest real
estate licensees and the purpose of such statutes is to guard against fraudulent real estate
practices. Pearl v. Florida Board of Real Estate, supra, at 192.
Significantly, Respondent's criminal conduct was not undertaken in furtherance of a real
estate transaction involving his participation as a principal broker or his status as a certified
Utah real estate instructor. While Respondent's misconduct did also not involve the operation
of his Utah real estate school, the transaction between Mr. Judd and Respondent was not
entirely unrelated to the latter's status as a licensee. Further, Respondent realized a
substantial financial benefit as a result of his criminal misconduct Simply put, it appears
likely that Mr. Judd loaned the monies in question to Respondent based—in part—on Mr.
5

Judd's reliance he would hold title to the personal property which was collateral for that loan.
Certain mitigating factors exist in this case. There is no evidence Respondent has previously
engaged in any criminal conduct or that his license as a principal broker or certification as a
real estate instructor has been otherwise subject to disciplinary sanction in the state.
Disciplinary action has been taken in two other cases after a licensee was convicted of a
criminal offense involving moral turpitude. Pursuant to a stipulation (In re Ostler, Case No.
RE89-06-10), an associate broker's license was suspended for one (1) year and thereafter
placed on probation for two (2) years, based on the conviction of possession of a forged
writing, a Class A misdemeanor. Significantly, Mr. Ostler had engaged in such criminal
conduct within the context of a real estate transaction. While Respondent has also been
convicted of a misdemeanor and his conduct involved a forged document, Respondent's
conviction was not related to conduct undertaken in a real estate transaction.
More recently, a real estate sales agent's license was placed on probation, as prompted
by the licensee's conviction of having made a corrupt offer to a bank officer ( I n re
Hutchinson, Case No. RE91-03-04). Similar to Mr. Hutchinson, Respondent's criminal
misconduct did not directly involve his status as a licensee and he did not utilize his licensure
to further his criminal activity. Unlike Mr. Hutchinson, this record reflects that Respondent
realized a significant personal gain from his criminal misdeed. It is arguable whether a short
term suspension of Respondent's license as a real estate principal broker and certification as a
real estate instructor may be warranted. However, the recommended order set forth below is
predicated on the fact that no direct nexus exists between Respondent's criminal conduct and
his existing licensure and certification through the Division. Further, there is no reason to
conclude Respondent will likely engage in similar criminal misconduct in the future or that
his ability to properly operate a real estate school in this state and provide instruction has
be^n seriously compromised by reason of his existing conviction.
RECOMMENDED ORDER
WHEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that Respondent's license to practice as a real estate
principal broker in the State of Utah and his certification as a real estate instructor be placed
on probation, subject to the following terms and conditions:
(1)

Respondent's licensure as a principal broker and his certification as a
real estate instructor shall remain on probation concurrent with the
duration of his criminal probation, subject to the terms and conditions
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which govern his criminal probation.
(2)

Respondent shall meet with the Real Estate Commission at the next
regularly scheduled Commission meeting after this Recommended
Order may be adopted by the Commission and the Director of the
Division of Real Estate. At that meeting with the Commission,
Respondent shall provide documentation which reflects the current
status of his criminal probation and whether he has complied with all
the terms of that probation.

(3)

If Respondent has satisfied the terms of his criminal probation to
date, Respondent may continue to practice as a real estate principal
broker and certified real estate instructor.

(4)

During the duration of Respondent's criminal probation, Respondent
shall submit a written report to the Division every six (6) months
from his probation officer as to whether he has continued to comply
with the terms of his criminal probation. Based on the Commission's
review of any given report, Respondent shall thereafter meet with the
Commission as may be warranted. At such time that Respondent's
criminal probation may be terminated, the Commission shall
determine whether to concurrently terminate Respondent's probation
regarding his licensure as a principal broker and certification as a real
estate instructor.

Should Respondent fail to comply with the terms and conditions set forth above, or
otherwise violate any statute or rule which governs his license to practice as a principal
broker or his certification as a real estate instructor in this state, further proceedings shall be
conducted and a determination made whether a sanction of greater severity than that set forth
herein is warranted.
It is further ordered that no disciplinary sanction shall enter as to Respondent's
continued ability to operate a real estate school in this state.

Dated this

V " * d a y of December, 1991.

J.(§teven Ekhpnd
Administrative Law Judge

BEFORE THE DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

In the Matter of the Certification of
Gary O'Brien to Act as a
Real Estate Instructor and to Operate a
Real Estate School and the License of
Gary O'Brien to Act as a
Real Estate Principal Broker

ORDER
Case No. RE90-11-23

By the Commission and Division Director
Pursuant to notice duly served, a supplemental hearing was conducted in the above-entitled
matter on January 15, 1992 before J. Steven Eklund, Administrative Law Judge for the
Department of Commerce, the Utah Real Estate Commission and Blaine E. Twitchell,
Director of the Division of Real Estate.
Thereafter, evidence was offered and received. The Commission and the Division
Director, now being fully advised in the premises, hereby adopt the Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law previously submitted in this matter and further enter the following:
SUPPLEMENTAL FINDINGS OF FACT
1. Respondent completed 100 hours of community service by November 1, 1991. No
restitution will be required of Respondent with regard to his criminal probation. On
November 12, 1991, Respondent's probationary supervision in that regard was terminated.
He is no longer required to report to Adult Probation and Parole authorities.
2. Litigation initiated against Respondent by Mr. Judd has been dismissed. Respondent
may subsequently seek dismissal of his countersuit regarding Mr. Judd.
ORDER
WHEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that Respondent's license to practice as a real estate
principal broker in the State of Utah and his certification as a real estate instructor be placed
on probation for one (1) year from the date of the termination of his criminal probation.
Thus, the probationary term with respect to Respondent's license and certification shall

continue until November 12, 1992.
Should Respondent violate any statute or rule which governs his practice as a principal
broker or his certification as a real estate instructor in this state, further proceedings shall be
conducted and a determination made whether a sanction of greater severity than set forth
herein is warranted.
It is further ordered that no disciplinary sanction shall enter as to Respondent's continued
ability to operate a real estate school in this state.
Dated this

/ 7^

day of January, 1992.

Blaine E. Twitchell, Director
Division of Real Estate

ADDENDUM VIII

DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
BLAINE E. TWITCHELL, DIRECTOR
160 EAST 3 00 SOUTH
P.O. BOX 45806
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84145-0806

BEFORE THE UTAH STATE REAL ESTATE COMMISSION
In the Matter of the License
of JAY WILSON to Act as
a Real Estate Sales Agent

STIPULATION & ORDER
CASE NO. RE91-04-13

The Real Estate Division of the Department of Commerce of the
State of Utah (the Division), by and through its Director, Blaine
E. Twitchell, and Jay Wilson (Wilson), a licensed real estate sales
agent hereby stipulate and agree as follows:
STIPULATION
1,

Wilson is and has been a licensee of the Division at all

times relevant to this case, holding License No. SA 34449.
2,

A complaint in the matter has been brought and properly

filed pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code Annotated Section 612-1, et sec., (1953, as amended).
3,

Wilson admits the jurisdiction of the Utah Real Estate

Commission (the Commission) over him and over the subject matter of
this action.
4,

Wilson specifically waives the right to confront adverse

witnesses and the right to a formal hearing pursuant to Utah Code
Annotated Section 61-2-1, et seq., (1953, as amended), and the
rules and regulations promulgated thereunder.
5,

The Division and Wilson recognize and agree that this

Stipulation alone shall not be binding upon the Commission. If the

Commission does not concur in the disciplinary action proposed
herein, this Stipulation shall be of no further force or effect and
a formal hearing shall be scheduled for this matter.
6.

Wilson acknowledges that upon approval by the Commission,

this Stipulation shall be made a part of the attached find Order,
and shall be the final compromise and settlement of this matter.
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Wilson acknowledges that he enters into this Stipulation

voluntarily, and that no promise or threat whatsoever has been made
by the Division, or any member, officer, agent or representative of
the Division to induce him to enter into this Stipulation,
8.

On July 30, 1990 Wilson entered a plea of guilty to Mail

Fraud, 18 U.S.C. Section 1341, and to Conspiracy, 18 U.S.C. Section
371 in U.S. District Court for the District of Utah in Case 90-CR005W.
9.

Wilson admits that the above conviction constitutes a

violation of Utah Code Annotated Section 61-2-11(12):

"...(12)

Conviction of a criminal offense involving moral turpitude."
10.

Respondent acknowledges that he has been informed of his

right to be represented by legal counsel, and that he has been
represented by Attorney Thomas V. Rasmussen in this matter.
11.

The Division and Wilson propose that Wilson's Utah real

estate license be revoked but that the revocation will be stayed
upon the following conditions:
a,

Wilson abides by the restitution schedule established by

the court and makes full restitution;
b.

Wilson's real estate license is placed on probation for

a term concurrent with his criminal probation; and

c.

Wilson commits no violations of the real estate licensing

law involving dishonesty, fraud, or misrepresentation during the
period of probation.
after

notice

and

If such violations are proven by the Division

hearing,

the

stay

will

be

lifted

and

the

revocation imposed.
12.

This Stipulation constitutes the entire agreement between

the parties herein and supersedes and cancels any and all prior
negotiations,

representations,

understandings,

or

agreements

between the parties. There are no verbal agreements which modify,
interpret, construe, or affect this agreement.
DATED this

//^

day of

^y/Jj/lUL/c«^

T

1993.

BLAINE E. fWITCHELL, DIRECTOR
DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
STATE OF UTAH
DATED this

day of

, 1993

jp- WILSON
DATED this

\ ^

day of

t-e^ ro<ru

, 1993.

THOMAS V. RASMUSSEN
ATTORNEY FOR JAY WILSON
ORDER
Based upon the

foregoing stipulation and for good cause

appearing therefore:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Jay Wilson's Utah real estate

license is revoked effective immediately, but that the revocation
shall be stayed upon the following conditions:
a.

Wilson

shall

abide

by

the

restitution

schedule

established by the court and make full restitution;
b.

Wilson's real estate license shall be placed on probation

for a term concurrent with his criminal probation; and
c.

Wilson shall commit no violations of the real estate

licensing law involving dishonesty, fraud, or misrepresentation
during the period of probation.

If such violations are proven by

the Division after notice and hearing, the stay shall be lifted and
the revocation imposed.
DATED this

2Sr^

day of

\KXXj!Ksi^-i/
^bfTOu^^^y

, 1993.

UTAH REAL ESTATE COMMISSION
y

/'

1

PAUL NEfUENSCHWANDER

Ab6e*\,f
BETH/TOLBERT

wm
ONS,

JR.

^H?6^-^
CLAUDIA E .

91-04-13.St

ASHBY

